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Thesis Summary  
 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs. Inc. 
and Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the future of patentability of genetic 
material is uncertain. In the U.S., the decision in Myriad which allowed the patenting of 
cDNA molecules seems to have limited the force of the concerned voices from the genomic 
research community that had called for substantial limitations on the patenting genetic 
material based on the argument that these patents seriously inhibit genomic research and 
prevent broader provision of genetic diagnostic tests to the public. In the EU, and in markets 
under the EPC, the patentability issue remain unclear due to lack of judicial guidance. This 
status quo coincides with the ambitions of governments in both sides of the Atlantic for 
incentivising research and investment in personalised medicine, a field that is dependent on 
genetic diagnostic tests and promises radical improvement in public healthcare provision, but 
also potentially lots of profit and tax. In the light of all these, this paper explores social, 
political and more particularly legal issues surrounding developments in genomic technologies 
and personalised medicine, and offers an extensive overview of the limits of substantive patent 
law in the patenting of genetic inventions in the U.S. and Europe. The paper concludes that 
the approach of the Biotechnology Directive under EU law setting an over-arching industrial 
applicability requirement for gene patents offers a balanced response to the challenges 
created by these patents. Other solutions such as widening the scope of compulsory licensing 
or the experimental use exception, or creating a sui generis gene right are also visited. Finally, 
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“It’s far more important to know what person the disease has than what disease the person has.” 
 – Hippocrates1  
 
“Medicine considers the human body as the means by which it is cured and by which it is driven away from 
health. The knowledge of anything, since all things have causes, is nor acquired or complete unless it is known 
by its causes. Therefore in medicine we ought to know the causes of sickness and health.”  




Personalised medicine, or precision medicine, in its broadest definition, can be summarised as 
the practice of medicine tailored to the individual patient. Although the concept is not new, 
with the recent scientific and technological development of the 21st century, the complete 
sequencing of the human genome and the rise of genomics, in its most contemporary sense, it 
means “the delivery of the right drug to the right patient at the right dose.”3 The 
development of new enabling technologies has made it possible for rapid advancement in the 
field of personalised medicine in the last two decades. Especially developments in genomics 
and pharmacogenetics, resulted in an increase in the efficiency of genomic sequencing 
technology which has made it easier and faster to discover genetic mutations or 
amplifications4 that create disease risk, while enabling cheaper and more accurate genetic 
tests to search for such risk factors in individual patients.5  
                                                
1 U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Paving the Way for Personalized Medicine: FDA’s Role in a New Era of 
Medical Product Development (October 2013), p.5. 
2 Charles F. Horne (ed.), The Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East, Vol. VI: Medieval Arabia (Parke, Austin, & 
Lipscomb, New York 1917), pp.90-91. 
3 Alessio Squassina and others, ‘Realities and expectations of pharmacogenomics and personalized medicine: 
impact of translating genetic knowledge into clinical practice’ (2010) 11(8) Pharmacogenomics 1149, p.1150. 
4 “Gene amplification is an increase in the number of copies of a gene without a proportional increase in other 
genes. This can result from duplication of a region of DNA that contains a gene through errors in DNA 
replication and repair machinery as well as through fortuitous capture by selfish genetic elements.” ‘Gene 
amplification’ in Nature journal website <https://www.nature.com/subjects/gene-amplification> accessed 5 
August 2017. 
5 European Parliament, Personalised medicine: The right treatment for the right person at the right time, (briefing paper, 
October 2015), pp.3-4. The cost of gene sequencing has decreased more than 16.000-fold in 10 years since the 
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Today, our knowledge of the human genome allows us the possibility to develop genetic tests 
that can diagnose an individual’s susceptibility to a certain disease, or provide individual 
genomic data that helps the clinical practitioner to decide the right treatment and the right 
dosage, or identify individuals who are unlikely to respond to a certain treatment or drug. All 
of these properties of personalised medicine place it “on the frontier of healthcare.”6 Its 
importance chiefly stems from its implications for public health care: If patients are to receive 
only the right treatments and drugs that will work best for them, not only the outcomes will 
significantly improve but also will increase available funds for national healthcare systems as 
thanks to the personalised medicine applications, national healthcare systems will save 
money.7 
 
Success of personalised medicine enterprises depends on continued efforts in three areas: (1) 
Knowledge production (research and development); (2) data management8; and (3) 
commercialization (product creation and marketing). Intellectual property law, and especially 
patent law play a crucial role in all of these areas. 9 This paper will focus mainly on patent law 
as a tool to create incentives for personalised medicine research and applications. Before 
moving on to the outline of this paper, lets explore some additional issues concerning 
personalised medicine, give a primer on the science involved, and finally demonstrate how 
gene patents are used to have proprietary control over gene testing applications (which are 
central to personalised medicine) via an example gene test. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP) according to the Personalized Medicine Coalition (PMC). 
PMC, The Case for Personalized Medicine (4th edn 2014), p.4.   
6 Commission (EC), European Perspectives in Personalised Medicine, (conference report: 12-13 May 2011), p.5. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Research that leads to clinical applications generally require linking genotype data to phenotype data. This is 
to reveal the probable expressions of a certain genetic makeup that are clinically significant for a group of 
patients that will be subject to a personalised medicine intervention. As a result of organization of scientific 
knowledge production in genomic sciences, several kinds of genotype data and phenotype data are created by 
different parties with divergent interests; moreover, the different modes that these parties produce data differ in 
their ability to having the data created protected by intellectual property. It is thus not surprising to observe that 
governmental initiatives promise legislative action and investment in the area of data management. However it 
must be kept in mind that if the aim is the increased rollout of new pharmacogenomics products and clinical 
applications, as the eventual profit from commercialization and leveraging financial risk are crucial concerns for 
all private parties involved in the effort, the potential for patent protection must be a central issue for any policy. 
Jasper A. Bovenberg, ‘Accessibility of biological data: a role for the European database right?’ in David Castle 
(ed), The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Innovation (Edward Elgar, 2009), p.337. 
9 Sharon Oriel, ‘Making a return on R&D: a business perspective’ in David Castle (ed), The Role of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Biotechnology Innovation, (Edward Elgar, 2009), p.131. 
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II. Personalised Medicine 
 
A personalised medicine application generally consists of two steps that correspond to two 
separate medical products. The first step is the diagnostic step, where diagnostic methods that 
include genetic tests, and devices such as imaging equipment, are used to determine the 
genotype10 and phenotype11 of the patient. This determination is used to identify the genetic 
profile of the patient within a subgroup that has been classified previously by research. The 
second step is the therapeutic stage, where treatment methods and products are used in light 
of the patient’s genetic profile that has been recognized to fall within a subgroup.12 Therefore, 
accurate diagnostic methods and in certain cases the determination of particular biomarkers13 
are critical to the success of personalised medicine applications.14 
 
Today, modern healthcare provision technique in industrialised nations in great part utilises a 
trial-and-error method with sub-optimal efficiency whereby therapeutic methods and 
products are administered to patients based on a medical doctor’s diagnosis based on general 
information.15 The patient’s reaction to the therapeutic method is then observed and in case 
of unsatisfactory response, the method is changed, e.g. the medications or doses are 
changed.16 The personalised medicine concept, on the other hand, envisions wide use of 
patient stratification based on pharmacogenomics research to forecast drug responses of 
patients based on their individual characteristics.17 Once this forecast can be accurately done, 
the most optimal therapeutic method can be used on the patient, and the waste (in time and 
money) created by the trial-and-error method can be avoided. This promise of the technology 
makes development of personalised medicine a politically valuable field for government 
                                                
10 Genotype is “the genetic constitution of an organism, as opposed to the expressed features, the phenotype.” 
‘Genotype’ in John Lackie (ed), A Dictionary of Biomedicine (OUP, 2015 Online Version). 
11 Phenotype is “the observable characters, including morphology and behaviour of an organism, regardless of 
the actual genotype of the organism. Identical genotypes do not necessarily produce identical phenotypes.” 
‘Phenotype’ in ibid. 
12 FDA, Paving the Way (n.1), p.8. 
13 Biomarker is “an indicator signalling an event or condition in a biological system or sample and giving a 
measure of exposure, effect, or susceptibility. A biomarker may be a measurable chemical, biochemical, 
physiological, behavioural, or other alteration within an organism.” ‘Biomarker’ in Richard Cammack and 
others (eds), Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology (2nd edn OUP, 2008 Online Version). 
14 FDA, Paving the Way (n.1), p.10. 
15 Ibid, p.6. 
16 Ibid. 
17 It has been argued certain such stratification in personalised medicine may cause confusing genetic trait based 
groupings with “sociological” subdivisions such as ethnicity or race and in the process risk misconstruing genetic 
differences as the ‘scientific basis’ of such subdivisions, which is a faulty interpretation of the scientific data. 
Shubha Ghosh, Identity, Invention, and the Culture of Personalized Medicine Patenting (CUP, 2012), p.126. 
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action, as the cost of healthcare services in the private market but also the size of public 
healthcare expenditures in national budgets is a politically sensitive issue.  
 
Whether personalised medicine as a concept can fulfil these promises is another matter. As 
advancements in genomic technology make gene testing and genetic research faster and 
cheaper, the number of genetic variations discovered increases rapidly. It is now known that 
genetic variations are very common in human beings, even considered by some 
commentators as the “norm”.18 Therefore establishing the clinical significance of spotting a 
variation in an individual for a previously sequenced gene is tricky business. The implications 
of such high incidence of variation between genomes of individuals for genetic diagnostic 
based personalised medicine applications are significant. For instance, in a recent article 
published in the Mosaic science magazine19 it has been argued that the fact that genetic tests 
in general yield a high rate of uncertain results as to the pathogenicity causes emotional and 
psychological distress for patience receiving “unknown significance” results in their genetic 
tests.20 That article further pointed out that the uncertainty regarding effects of genetic 
variations and lack of scientific consensus have at least in some instances caused changes in 
the reported clinical significances of certain variations over time, resulting in lawsuits brought 
by relatives of patients who got “unknown significance” results in their tests for variations that 
were upgraded to pathological in the face of more recent scientific findings.21 Whether 
genetic test service providers can be held liable for the confidence of their test results could be 
a significant legal problem as genetic testing becomes more and more widespread. But also 
from a healthcare policy perspective (and indeed a philosophical perspective) the idea of a 
healthcare provision system that comes to depend more frequently on preventative genetic 
diagnostics and prophylactic measures will pose questions not easy to answer. However, these 
issues, together with the question of whether personalised medicine research and 
development, and its clinical applications can provide economic efficiencies that could reflect 
to healthcare consumers and public budgets as explained above, is not within the scope of this 
work. Yet, inasmuch as many governments make this case, this paper will be concerned with 
                                                
18 “It turns out that rare genetic variants are the norm. We all have hundreds of them. My colleagues and I 
studied all 20,000 genes in 1,000 random people from the UK general population. We found that, on average, 
each person had 22,000 variants, of which 160 were very rare, not present in anyone else in the study.” Nazneen 
Rahman, ‘We need to change the way we think about genetic variation’ (mosaicscience.com, 18 July 2017) 
<https://mosaicscience.com/extra/we-need-change-way-we-think-about-genetic-variation> accessed 18 
August 2017. 
19 Published by the Wellcome Trust. 
20 Carrie Arnold, ‘The uncertain future of genetic testing’, (mosaicscience.com, 18 July 2017) 
<https://mosaicscience.com/story/uncertain-future-genetic-testing> accessed 18 August 2017. 
21 Ibid. 
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finding out the potential of the current patenting landscape for policy goals that seek to create 
a fertile ground for the development of the personalised medicine technologies.  
 
Although this is not the main focus of this work, a warning must be made against 
underestimating the complexity of the problems underlying the relatively straightforward 
sounding policy goal of ‘incentivising the development of a certain field of science or 
technology’. The economics of the policy notwithstanding, any policy action in the field of 
science and technology will have to interact with the existing system of scientific production, 
which has its own complex dynamics. The relationship between science and technical or 
technological advancement is complex, and cannot be assumed without any critical reflection. 
The nature of the relationship will and affect the outcomes of any political action aimed at 
creating technological results for the general public. 
 
Recently, the quality of genomic and other biotechnological research has been subject to 
much criticism. Daniel Sarewitz, a professor of science and society at Arizona State 
University, has launched a well publicized criticism of the faulty application of the scientific 
method in certain scientific areas including biomedical science, claiming that most of the 
work created in this area is of poor quality and not replicable. He argues that institutions of 
scientific production nowadays are plagued with a culture that prizes reputation of individual 
scientists and research institutions that flows from the sheer amount of publications or well-
publicised research (and the flow of grant money that corresponds with these) rather than 
achievement of practical goals, and that the peer-review system of controlling quality of 
scientific production is failing to weed out bad research due to the vicious synergies of 
interests that are created by the centrality of reputation. Sarewitz points out to biomedical 
science as a field particularly affected by this vicious circle22, and argues that the fact that 
                                                
22 “[...] most of the evidence of poor scientific quality is coming from fields related to health, biomedicine, and 
psychology [...]”, Daniel Sarewitz, ‘Saving Science’ (Spring/Summer 2016) 49 The New Atlantis, pp.4–40; “[...] 
$28 billion per year is wasted on biomedical research that is unreproducible. Science isn’t self-correcting; it’s 
self-destructing.” Leonard P. Freedman and others, ‘The Economics of Reproducibility in Preclinical Research’ 
(2015) 13-6 PLOS Biology, quoted in Sarewitz, ‘Saving Science’. Sarewitz recounts a breast cancer activist Fran 
Visco’s experience in her struggle to procure funding for breast cancer treatment research: ““all the money that 
was thrown at breast cancer created more problems than success,” Visco says. What seemed to drive many of 
the scientists was the desire to “get above the fold on the front page of the New York Times,” not to figure out 
how to end breast cancer. It seemed to her that creativity was being stifled as researchers displayed “a lemming 
effect,” chasing abundant research dollars as they rushed from one hot but ultimately fruitless topic to another. 
“We got tired of seeing so many people build their careers around one gene or one protein,” she says.” Sarewitz, 
‘Saving Science’. 
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biomedical science relies too much on ‘big data’ has made the problem irreproducible and 
poor results more acute in the field.23  
 
Certainly, genomic science and genetic engineering, and personalised medicine as a corollary 
are fields that may be threatened by the developments that Sarewitz warns us. Efforts that 
supposedly have the goal of nurturing and development of the science and technology of 
personalised medicine should find solutions to avoid incentivising bad research. 
 
These questions notwithstanding, legal issues surrounding personalised medicine could be 
said to focus on two broad fields of debate (Box. 1). It can be seen that patent law is closely 
related most of the problematic topics in these fields. 
 
Moral field: Implications for i) the relationship between personhood and property, ii) the 
meaning of humanity and the human condition. 




The first field comprises of disputes that relate to the fundamental philosophical questions 
surrounding the creation of exclusionary economic rights based on biological processes of the 
human body, and in a broader context, the moral implications of legal rules that touch issues 
such as manipulation human nature vis-à-vis a shared humanity. Personalised medicine, by 
its reliance on gene patents and protections on diagnostic methods, gives rise to these 
important moral questions that lawyers have to tackle when discussing the appropriate legal 
framework for this new technological phenomenon. As these moral questions are more likely 
to be addressed by rational arguments and philosophical discourse, rather than the 
requirements of political realities such as balancing and compromise, I call this first set of 
implications ‘moral’, as opposed to political. 
 
The second field comprises of disputes that are related more to the economic and industrial 
organization that is formed around personalised medicine technology and applications, and 
accordingly the reflection of this organization on social organizations. In this context, the 
                                                
23 Ibid. 
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legal framework in which personalised medicine proliferates has an effect on the distribution 
of wealth/welfare and power: Such as how the benefits created by these new applications are 
distributed amongst the population; how the risk posed by harmful results that might arise 
from these applications will be managed and the burdens distributed; how the legal 
protection regime and the revenues that are associated with this protection affects the overall 
structure of the market for healthcare and the associated industries; or how the new structure 
of these industries affect the relationship between the actors and regulators in these industries. 
Having this context in mind, I call the second set of implications ‘political’, in distinction to 
the first set discussed above. 
 
The problematic area of healthcare policy covers many important questions for policy makers 
whose answers will to an extent determine the financial landscape of the personalised 
medicine sector, both in industry and research. The questions are about the incentivising 
strategies directed to investments in healthcare provision and/or investments in research and 
development of medical technologies including pharmacogenomics and genetic engineering. 
 
The role of patent law and gene patents in personalised medicine business and 
policy 
 
Gene patents come in various claim structures, there is no single model.24 Typically the 
claims are related to two types of inventions; the isolated DNA molecule, and the method for 
comparing a sample sequence taken from a patient to the claimed reference sequence, and 
these type of patents might also include claims concerning the drawing of diagnostic 
conclusions from this comparison.25 Nicholson Price II helpfully groups gene patents relevant 
to medicine in two categories, namely biotechnological patents and diagnostic patents.26 
According to this classification, biotech patents are patents that control the gene sequence 
encoding a useful protein, thus generating economical value the control over the production 
that protein product. Diagnostic patents on the other hand seek to control a method for 
                                                
24 W. Nicholson Price II, ‘Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome Sequencing and 
Personalized Medicine’, (2012) 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1601, p.1607. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Price cites Holman classifying gene patents into four categories, namely biotechnological patents, diagnostic 
testing, research tools, and forensic testing, but notes that only the first to are “highly relevant” to medicine. 
Ibid, citing Christopher M. Holman, ‘Trends in Human Gene Patent Litigation’ (2008) 322 Science 198. 
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determining whether a protein is produced naturally in the patient’s body.27 Myriad’s 
BRCA1 patent is a patent of this second type. 
 
This issue of whether gene patents have been stimulating or inhibiting research and 
development in genomic sciences have been a controversial subject for a long time.28 
Concerning the effects of patent law on genetic diagnostic tests, the debate was particularly 
intense in the U.S. in the second half of 2000s, that is in the period leading to the cases of 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs. Inc. 29 and Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc..30 This period saw vocal expressions of concern from the research community 
that argued that exclusive licensing practices of university technology transfer offices and 
industry actors concerning their product and method patents on genes were potentially 
blocking many new research enterprises, and limiting patient access to genetic tests.31 These 
apprehensions culminated in the preparation of a very critical report by the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services in April 2010 (henceforth SACGHS Patent Report).32  
 
The SACGHS Patent Report found that (1) “the prospect of patent protection of a genetic 
research discovery does not play a significant role in motivating scientists to conduct genetic 
research”, patents had stimulated some private actors into investing in research but since the 
bulk of the research was funded by the U.S. Government, “patents are not needed for much 
of U.S. basic genetic research to occur”; also “there is evidence to suggest that patents on 
genes discourage follow-on research”, “ patents are not needed to encourage disclosure in 
industry”, “no cases [were found] in which possession of exclusive rights was necessary for the 
development of a particular genetic test”, “ exclusive rights do not result in faster test 
development”, and “patents are already hindering the development of multiplex tests” (2) 
“Where patents and licensing practices have created a sole provider of a genetic test, patient 
                                                
27 Price (n.24), p.1608. 
28 For a widely cited article that point to the risk of inhibition, see Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’ (1998) 280 Science 698. 
29 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
30 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
31 See generally: Mildred K. Cho and others, ‘Effects of patents and licenses on the provision of clinical genetic 
testing services’ (2003) 5(1) J Mol Diagnostics 3; K. Jensen and F. Murray,  ‘Intellectual property. Enhanced: 
intellectual property landscape of the human genome’ (2015) 310 Science 239; Timothy Caulfield and others, 
‘Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting Controversies’ (2006) 24(9) Nature 
Biotechnology 1091; Robert Cook-Deegan and others, ‘The dangers of diagnostic monopolies’, (2009) 458 
Nature 405. 
32 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient 
Access to Genetic Tests: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society [SACGHS Patent 
Report] (April 2010). 
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access to those tests has suffered […]”; and finally (3) “significant concerns about the quality 
of a genetic test arise when it is provided by a patent-protected sole provider.”33 The report 
also made six recommendations, Recommendation 1, which is the most relevant to 
substantive patent law, recommended:34 
 
“[the promotion of] the following statutory changes: 
A. The creation of an exemption from liability for infringement of patent claims 
on genes for anyone making, using, ordering, offering for sale, or selling a test 
developed under the patent for patient-care purposes. 
B. The creation of an exemption from patent infringement liability for those who 
use patent- protected genes in the pursuit of research.”35 
 
The SACGHS Patent Report generated a backlash from the industry, academia, and certain 
scientists equal to it in intensity.36 Some commentators pointed out that the findings of the 
Report should be interpreted not as failings of the patent system per se, but as results of 
opportunistic and short-sighted patent policy on the part of universities and certain private 
sector actors.37 It is also argued that the SACGHS findings are mostly relevant to ‘first-
generation’ diagnostic tests which were mostly a result of publicly funded genomic research 
and were highly correlated with disease, whereas next-generation diagnostic tests concerning 
genetic variations whose correlations to clinical significance are less easily established, require 
more focused private involvement and investment in order to be developed and marketed.38 
For example, in the Myriad case, the SACGHS Report was cited in a negative light by 
                                                
33 Ibid, pp.1-4. 
34 The findings and recommendations of the Report were not a product of consensus amongst the members of 
the preparing committee. Three members wrote a joint dissent disagreeing with many of the findings of the 
report, and all the statutory changes that were recommended. They concluded: “The suspension of patent 
protections such as exemptions from liability for patent infringement for a restricted class of innovation (gene 
patents), unless they are determined to be non-patentable (for instance, a court determination that they are a 
“product of nature”), is unwarranted and a risky intrusion in to a process that has delivered many key 
innovations to needy Americans.” Mara Aspinall and others, ‘Statement of Dissent from Ms. Aspinall, Dr. 
Billings, and Ms. Walcoff’ in SACGHS Patent Report (n.32), in appendix. 
35 SACGHS Patent Report (n.32), p.4. 
36 See Biotechnology Innovation Organisation (BIO), ‘Hindering Progress: Gene Patent Limits Could Impede 
Innovation’ (BIO website) <https://www.bio.org/articles/hindering-progress-gene-patent-limits-could-impede-
innovation> accessed 1 September 2017; Christopher M. Holman, ‘The Critical Role of Patents in the 
Development, Commercialization and Utilization of Innovative Genetic Diagnostic Tests and Personalized 
Medicine’ (2015) 21 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 297, pp.306-312. 
37 Julia Carbone and others, ‘DNA patents and Diagnostics: Not a Pretty Picture’ (August 2010) 28(8) Nature 
Biotechnology 784. For a later work highlighting the role of “practices and institutions” (besides legal rules) in 
the matter see E. Richard Gold and Julia Carbone, ‘Myriad Genetics: In the eye of the policy storm’ (2010) 12(4 
Suppl) Genet Med S39. 
38 Holman, ‘The Critical Role of Patents’ (n.36), p.310. 
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various amicus curiae briefs that called for the upholding of gene patents.39 The amici brief by 
Christopher M. Holman and Robert Cook-Deegan in support of neither party pointed out 
that: 
 
“[…] companies focused on the development of pharmacogenomics and 
personalized medicine—technologies widely viewed as critical to the future of 
pharmaceutical development and healthcare—point to gene patents as critical to 
securing the funding necessary to bring these products to market […] Affirmance 
of the decision below [the District Court decision invalidating the claims on 
genetic material] could dramatically reduce the private incentive for investment in 
innovation in these and related fields. […] Much of the future of genetic testing 
will lie in identifying more complex patterns of genetic variation involving a large 
number of genes dispersed throughout the genome, or identification of complex 
gene expression patterns. Personalized medicine will involve identifying 
correlations between genetic variation and specific therapeutic compounds. These 
next-generation diagnostic testing products and services might very well require a 
substantial private investment, increasing the importance of the patent incentive. 
A wholesale elimination of patent protection for genetic inventions, as embodied in the decision 
below, could impair future innovation in diagnostics.”40 [emphasis added] 
 
Today, after the Supreme Court decision in Myriad upholding the claim on the cDNA 
molecule, the debate surrounding the effects of gene patents on the availability of genetic 
diagnostic tests and their impact on research has subsided somewhat, and the patent system 
can be said to be still generally considered as a proper incentive for investments in genetic 
diagnostic tests and their applications.41 
 
                                                
39 Ibid, p.308. 
40 Christopher M. Holman and Robert Cook-Deegan, ‘Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party in The 
Association of Molecular Pathology et al. v. USPTO and Myriad Genetics, Inc.’ (28 Oct 2010) (U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, Docket No. 2010-1406 [653 F.3d 1329]), pp.29-31. 
41 Holman, ‘The Critical Role of Patents’ (n.36), p.308; Leland L. Black, ‘Patenting and Protecting Personalized 
Medicine Innovation Post-Mayo, Myriad, and Limelight’ (2017) 95 N.C. L. Rev. 493, pp.493-522. 
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III. A Primer to the Science Involved42 
 
This section will be helpful in understanding the science described in the later sections in 
discussing substantive patent law. 
 
The path from DNA to Protein 
 
Proteins are complex molecules that have a crucial role in the structure and activity in every 
cell and system and thus are essential to the living organism. Proteins consist of one or more 
amino acid chains (proteins are also called polypeptides after the peptide bond that ties the 
amino acids together) that are folded into different three-dimensional shapes (called 
“conformations”), which determine their function.43 Proteins vary broadly in size, from 6 to 
around 33,000 amino acids.44 
 
The DNA stores the genetic information required for the synthesis of proteins from amino 
acids. There are 20 different kinds of amino acids with different chemical properties that are 
coded for in the DNA. Protein synthesis in a cell happens in two steps called transcription and 
translation. But before we go into these, I shall briefly explain the structure of the molecules 
that have a major role in these steps, namely the polynucleotides DNA, RNA and mRNA. 
 
The structure of polynucleotides 
 
The DNA and RNA are polymers that are built from chains of chemical units called 
nucleotides. This is why they are also called polynucleotides. In a polynucleotide, nucleotides 
are bounded together in a chain via covalent bonding between the sugar of a nucleotide to 
the phosphate in the other, to form what is called a sugar-phosphate backbone. Chemically, 
nucleotides are nitrogenous bases and they are divided into two types according to the 
structure of their bases; pyrimidines and purines. The pyrimidine bases in a DNA molecule are 
                                                
42 The scientific background information given in this section follows these two publications: Bruce Alberts and 
others, Molecular Biology of the Cell (6th edn Garland Science, 2015); Neil A. Campbell and others, Biology: Concepts 
and Connections (4th edn Pearson, 2003). 
43 Campbell, Biology (n.42), p.42. Proteins are divided into seven major classes according to their functions: 
Structural, contractile (such as in muscular movement), storage, defensive (such as in antibodies), transport (e.g. 
hemoglobin), signal (e.g. hormones), and enzymes. Enzymes are proteins that catalyse chemical reactions 
without changing into a different molecule itself; enzymes regulate almost all chemical activity in the organism. 
Ibid. 
44 Alberts, Molecular Biology (n.42), p.121.  
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Thymine (T) and Cytosine (C), and the purines are Adenine (A) and Guanine (G). The RNA 
molecule contains a different pyrimidine Uracil (U), instead of Thymine (T). The chemical 
properties of the nucleotides make it possible that hydrogen bonds are formed between A 
bases and T (U in RNA) bases, and between G bases and C bases (in RNA G may 
occasionally pair with U)45. Thus, the pairing nucleotides are said to be “complimentary” to 
each other. 
 
In nature, the DNA molecule exists in the cell in a structure called the double helix, in which 
two strands or chains of DNA polynucleotides are attached, or “annealed”, to each other by 
forming hydrogen bonds between their nucleotides, as explained above. DNA molecules 
contain the information required for the cell to synthesize proteins (and RNA) as an end 
product and the double helix structure and the complimentary nature of the nucleotides 
make it possible for the cell to ‘read’ the code, or genes, contained in the DNA.   
 
Gene and Genome 
 
At this point a short description of the concepts of the gene and the genome could be useful. 
DNAs of living organisms may contain billions of nucleotides, but only certain specific 
sequences of nucleotides in any given polynucleotide are significant in the cellular processes of 
organisms. Such discrete nucleotide sequences in their entirety are called genes. The Oxford 
Concise Medical Dictionary (9th Ed.) defines gene as:  
 
“the basic unit of genetic material, which is carried at a particular place on a 
chromosome. Originally it was regarded as the unit of inheritance and mutation 
but is now usually defined as a sequence of DNA or RNA that acts as the unit 
controlling the formation of a single polypeptide chain…”46 
 
The genome on the other hand signifies the whole set of genes in an organism. The human 
genome comprises all genes that are located in the 23 chromosome pairs.47 
 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
46 ‘Gene’ in Elizabeth Martin (ed), Concise Medical Dictionary (9th edn OUP, 2015 Online Version). 




Step 1 in protein synthesis: Transcription and RNA splicing 
 
Transcription is the process of ‘reading’ of a section of the DNA within the cell. Briefly 
explained, a special protein called the RNA polymerase48 breaks open the double helix 
structure of the DNA, and synthesizes RNA by putting together the nucleotides 
complimentary to those on the strand of DNA that it is ‘reading’. Thus RNA polymerases 
‘transcribe’ the code contained on the DNA onto the RNA molecule.  
 
The RNA polymerase transcribes the target DNA sequence in its entirety on the newly 
formed RNA. At this point the RNA will include the coding exons but also the non-coding 
introns in the relevant gene as described above. As the RNA emerges from the RNA 
polymerase, a process called RNA splicing begins that removes the introns from the new 
polynucleotide. The chemistry of RNA splicing is complex, and will not be described in detail 
here. Suffices to say that the resulting molecule that contains only exons is called the mRNA 
(short for messenger RNA) and abnormal splicing of the RNA may cause diseases and 
disorders. The production of the mRNA brings us to the next step in the path from DNA to 
protein: translation.  
 
As a caveat, we should add that for many genes, the end product is not a protein but RNA 
molecules with specialised functions. There are various chemical activities in the cell in which 
specialised RNA have a role, such as in RNA splicing or translation.49 
 
Complimentary DNA (cDNA)  
 
Before moving on to the second step in protein synthesis in the cell, we should stop to 
introduce an important concept for patent law and genomics research and industry in 
general. As explained above, the mature mRNA as produced in the nucleus of the eukaryotic 
cell contains information in a structure required for protein synthesis in a cell, that is, a gene 
sequence comprised of only exons that will correspond to a protein when processed by the 
                                                
48 While bacteria only have one type of RNA polymerase, there are three types of RNA polymerases in 
eukaryotic cells (types I, II and III). In eukaryotes, protein-coding genes are transcribed by RNA polymerase II. 
Alberts, Molecular Biology (n.42), p.309. 
49 Ibid, p.333. 
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ribosomes of a competent cell. Simplified, the mRNA is the recipe for a protein written in the 
alphabet of the four nucleotides. However the mRNA as a molecule is not useful by itself for 
genetic engineering purposes. So methods have been developed to transcribe the information 
coded in the mRNA to a single stranded DNA polynucleotide, which can be later used in 
applications such as cloning the gene in bacteria or introducing the DNA in another 
organism to express proteins.50  
 
The polynucleotide synthesised by transcription from an mRNA is called complimentary 
DNA, or cDNA. The production of the cDNA conceptually plays a crucial role in patent law, 
as the creation of the cDNA under laboratory conditions and with human interference makes 
it an important point for arguments concerning patentability that cDNA is different from the 
naturally occurring molecule, given that the invention being not naturally occurring is 
essential for patent-eligibility under the patent laws of many jurisdictions.51 The fact that the 
same DNA sequence can be spliced in different ways in the cell to produce mRNAs coding 
for varying proteins52 is another reason that makes cDNA important element in protecting 
protein products by patents. 
 
Step 2 in protein synthesis: Translation 
 
Once a mature mRNA molecule is formed, the next step in the path from DNA to protein is 
the conversion of the information encoded in the mRNA in the language of the four 
nucleotides into a recipe that instructs which and how many of the 20 amino acids will be 
assembled to build the polypeptide; thus the term ‘translation’. In this step, specialised RNA 
molecules called transfer RNA, or tRNA, couple with amino acids that correspond to their 
individual specific chemical attributes. Then, within a molecular structure called a ribosome, 
the tRNA molecule attaches its zone called the anticodon to three consecutive nucleotides on 
the mRNA strand, called collectively a codon. Once attached to the codon, the tRNA adds the 
amino acid it has coupled with to the end of the amino acid that a previous tRNA attached to 
the previous codon had brought into the ribosome, forming a polypeptide chain, which after 
completion folds into a protein or a subunit of a protein.  
 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
51 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
52 Alberts, Molecular Biology (n.42), p.319. 
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This ordered placement of amino acids in a polypeptide chain in accordance with the 
consecutive three-nucleotide codons in the mRNA sequence is the essence of what is called 
the “genetic code”. The rules of the genetic code were deciphered in the 1960s, which 
signified a breakthrough in genomic science. Most amino acids are coded by more than one 
codon, while some are coded by only one.53 One codon also acts as a signal for the beginning 
of the protein-coding sequence, and three distinct codons represent the end of the sequence.54 
 
 
IV. An Example Gene Test with Commentary  
 
The following example gene test (‘assay’) was given the patent description of Myriad 
Genetics, Inc.’s BRCA1 patent55 that was at issue in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc..56 The fragments in bold italics are the original text of 
the example gene test. Text in square brackets is my commentary. Underlined text highlights 
the points where the patent interferes with the method. The numbered claims refer to the 
claims of the BRCA1 patent.57 The purpose of this section is to explain how gene patents can 
provide to right holders exclusionary proprietary control over gene test applications. This 
gene test is a basic test using somewhat old technology, but the method is still relevant and 
easy to follow and explain. 
  
                                                
53 For example, the codon UGG codes only for the amino acid Trp (Tryptophan) while Ala (Alanine) is coded 
by GCA, GCC, GCG, or GCU (Note that urasil (U) corresponds to thymine (T) in DNA). Ibid, p.334. To 
provide an actual example, in Myriad’s BRCA1 patent (U.S. Pat. No 5,747,282) claim 1 claims the DNA 
sequence coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide with the sequence MetAspLeuSerAlaLeu(…), the reader may 
compare this sequence to the DNA sequence claimed in claim 2 and find that the polypeptide sequence 
corresponds to the DNA sequence starting from nucleotide position 120: ATGGATTTATCTGCTCTT(…) 
The first 119 nucleotides are not translated in protein synthesis. Such untranslated sequences at the beginning of 
the coding region of the gene exist in all mRNAs and have various functions including the regulation of the 
translation process. They are collectively called the 5′ untranslated region, or 5′ UTR. Sandrine Caputo and 
others, ‘Description and analysis of genetic variants in French hereditary breast and ovarian cancer families 
recorded in the UMD-BRCA1/BRCA2 databases’ (2012) 40 Nucleic Acids Research, pp.D992-D1002; 
Emanuela Signori and others, ‘A somatic mutation in the 5'UTR of BRCA1 gene in sporadic breast cancer 
causes down-modulation of translation efficiency’ (2001) 20 Oncogene 4596. See BRCA1 mRNA GenBank 
database entry: M.H. Skolnick, ‘Homo sapiens breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility (BRCA1) mRNA, 
complete cds’ <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore/U14680> accessed 20 August 2017. 
54 The AUG codon acts both as the “initiation codon” but also codes for Met (Methionine), while UAA, UAG 
and UGA act as ‘STOP’ codons. Alberts, Molecular Biology (n.42), p.319.  
55 Myriad Genetics, Inc. (1998) ‘17Q-linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility gene’ (U.S. Patent No: 
5,747,282). 
56 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). The case will be examined in detail in Part B below. 
57 Text of the claims are not provided here for brevity. See patent text (n.55) at 
<https://patents.google.com/patent/US5747282A/en> 
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EXAMPLE 11 Two Step Assay to Detect the Presence of BRCA1 in a Sample 
Patient sample is processed according to the method disclosed by Antonarakis et al. 
(1985), separated through a 1% agarose gel and transferred to nylon membrane for 
Southern blot analysis.  
[*ZTC: “Antonarakis et al…” Example uses of the invention proposed in the patent are 
based on previously discovered methods to prove industrial applicability of the invention. 
Here the DNA sample taken from the patient is isolated and cloned by the cited method, and 
the cloned patient sample DNA is then transferred to a membrane on which the test is going 
to be made.58]  
Membranes are UV cross linked at 150 mJ using a GS Gene Linker (Bio-Rad). BRCA1 
probe corresponding to nucleotide positions 3631-3930 of SEQ ID NO:1 is subcloned 
into pTZ18U.  
[*ZTC: Here the patient sample DNA on the membrane are immobilized by a technique 
called UV crosslinking. Then, a BRCA1 probe is cloned.59 Cloning is done by first combining 
the gene of interest (BRCA1) into the commercially available cloning phagemid pTZ18U. 
The phagemid is a “vector”, or a small DNA molecule that is used for introducing a 
recombinant gene into a bacterium. The gene will then replicate itself using the organism of 
the bacterium, multiplying the amount of the sample DNA. Note that first clause of Claim 8 
covers the phagemid in which the BRCA1 gene is combined (“a replicative cloning vector”), 
and the second clause covers the DNA that are created by the self replication of the phagemid 
in the bacterium (“a replicon operative in a host cell.”) The “subcloning” of the BRCA1 
probes into the phagemid is achieved by first cutting out the desired length of BRCA1 gene 
from BRCA1 samples amplified by techniques such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and 
                                                
58 S. E. Antonarakis and others,  ‘Hemophilia A Detection of Molecular Defects and of Carriers by DNA 
Analysis’ (1985) 313 N Engl J Med 842. The method uses the technique of “Southern blotting”. Blotting is “a 
general term for transferring molecules from an acrylamide or agarose gel in which they have been separated 
electrophoretically, to a paper-like membrane, usually nylon or nitrocellulose, maintaining the spatial 
arrangement. The binding interaction with the membrane can then be stabilized and the bound molecules can 
be detected at high sensitivity by hybridization (in the case of DNA and RNA), or antibody labelling (in the case 
of protein). RNA blots are called northern blots, DNA blots are Southern blots, (named after E. Southern, who 
developed the technique), protein blots are western blots. In northwestern blotting protein is transferred but is probed 
with specific RNA[…]”. ‘Blotting’ in Lackie, A Dictionary of Biomedicine (n.10).  
59 Probe is: “(in molecular biology), a shorthand term for a labelled complementary sequence of DNA or RNA 
that will hybridize with the relevant sequence in a test sample. The label chosen depends on the detection system 
to be employed (e.g. radioactive or fluorescent labels).” ‘Probe’ in ibid. ‘Hybridization’ and the use of probes are 
discussed in length below in the text. 
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recombining them into the phagemid. Note that Claims 16 and 17 cover the “prime” 
molecules required to start the PCR process to produce a viable amount of sample BRCA1 
genes.60 Also Claim 18 covers detection kits that include at least one ‘prime’ molecule.]  
The phagemids are transformed into E. coli MV1190 infected with M13KO7 helper 
phage (Bio-Rad, Richmond, Calif.). Single stranded DNA is isolated according to 
standard procedures (see Sambrook et al., 1989). 
 
[*ZTC: Then this phagemid is placed into E. coli bacteria of strand MV1190, which in 
combination with the M13K07 ‘helper’ virus that are made to infect the bacteria, synthesize 
and secrete single stranded copies of the DNA contained by the phagemid. This single 
stranded DNA that are copied in the E. coli are then isolated using a chemical process.61 This 
isolated single stranded DNA (vector DNA) will be used as the primary probe in the 
hybridization process described below. Note that Claim 2, 3 and 5 cover the probe molecule. 
Claim 7 covers different variants of the gene of interest that may also be cloned as probes and 
used in the test. 
 
“…phagemids are transformed into E. coli…”: The “scope note” accompanying the 
entry for “Transformation, Bacterial” in the U.S. National Library of Medicine Medical 
Subjects Headings list (MeSH) states: “The heritable modification of the properties of a 
competent bacterium by naked DNA from another source. The uptake of naked DNA is a 
naturally occuring phenomenon in some bacteria. It is often used as a gene transfer 
technique”.62] 
                                                
60 From the text of the patent description (n.55): “The primer pairs of the present invention are useful for 
determination of the nucleotide sequence of a particular BRCA1 allele using PCR. The pairs of single-stranded 
DNA primers can be annealed to sequences within or surrounding the BRCA1 gene on chromosome 17q21 in 
order to prime amplifying DNA synthesis of the BRCA1 gene itself. A complete set of these primers allows 
synthesis of all of the nucleotides of the BRCA1 gene coding sequences, i.e., the exons. The set of primers 
preferably allows synthesis of both intron and exon sequences. Allele-specific primers can also be used. Such 
primers anneal only to particular BRCA1 mutant alleles, and thus will only amplify a product in the presence of 
the mutant allele as a template.” 
61 For detailed description (or “recipe”) of the cloning process see Joseph Sambrook and others, Molecular Cloning: 
A Laboratory Manual (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 2000), Chapter 3 Protocols 6-8. For phagemid vector 
cloning with helper phages see Marjorie A. Hoy, Insect Molecular Genetics: An Introduction to Principles and Applications, 
(Academic Press, 1994), p.168; Antibody Design Laboratories, ‘Working with helper phages’ 
<http://abdesignlabs.com/technical-resources/helper-phages/> accessed 10 August 2017. 
62 U.S. National Library of Medicine, ‘Transformation, Bacterial MeSH Descriptor Data 2017’, 




Blots are prehybridized for 15-30 min at 65° C. in 7% sodium dodecyl sulfate (SDS) 
in 0.5M NaPO4. The methods follow those described by Nguyen et al., 1992. The 
blots are hybridized overnight at 65° C. in 7% SDS, 0.5M NaPO4with 25-50 ng/ml 
single stranded probe DNA. Post-hybridization washes consist of two 30 min 
washes in 5% SDS, 40 mM NaPO4 at 65° C., followed by two 30 min washes in 1% 
SDS, 40 mM NaPO4 at 65° C.  
[*ZTC: Hybridization is the process used to test whether a sample polynucleotide contains a 
certain gene of interest. This is done by introducing single stranded sample polynucleotides 
and single stranded reference polynucleotides containing the gene of interest to the same 
medium. If the sample polynucleotide contains the gene of interest, the reference 
polynucleotide, called a hybridization probe, will ‘anneal’ to it, creating a double stranded 
molecule as the corresponding nucleotides of the sample and probe will correspond and form 
hydrogen bonds. The reference polynucleotide, or probe, is attached with a molecular 
marker, or ‘label’; that is a molecule that is capable to be detected by various methods. For 
example, a reference polynucleotide may be attached with a radioactive molecule that can be 
easily spotted by various imaging methods such as autoradiography. These probes are called 
radiolabeled probes. Labels can also be non-radioactive. In this test, a non-radioactive 
chemiluminescent marker, AMPPD, is used together with an alkaline-phosphatase labels that 
activates the marker. When an AMPPD substrate is added to the medium containing probes 
attached with alkaline-phosphatase labels, the labels activate the AMPPD, and the probes will 
show up on X-ray film.  
This test is a two-step assay, in which two hybridization procedures are run on the 
patient sample DNA. In the first step, vector DNA containing the primary probe are 
hybridized with the patient sample DNA. Recall that the primary probe contains the gene of 
interest, namely the BRCA1. The primary probe will anneal with a patient sample DNA if 
that DNA contains the gene of interest. In the second step, a secondary probe is hybridized 
with the vector DNA .The primary probes are not labeled. The secondary probe is a 
commercially available oligonucleotide probe that has an alkaline-phosphatase label. During 
the second-step this secondary probe anneals to a separate section of the vector DNA. The 
technical result is that the signal to noise ratio becomes higher, but since the second probe 
attaches to the single stranded phagemid DNA containing the gene of interest that has 
already annealed to the patient sample (if test is positive) detection of the second probe label 
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in imaging means that the primary probe has successfully hybridized, therefore a positive 
result.63] 
Next the blots are rinsed with phosphate buffered saline (pH 6.8) for 5 min at room 
temperature and incubated with 0.2% casein in PBS for 30-60 min at room 
temperature and rinsed in PBS for 5 min. The blots are then preincubated for 5-10 
minutes in a shaking water bath at 45° C. with hybridization buffer consisting of 6M 
urea, 0.3M NaCI, and 5X Denhardt's solution (see Sambrook, et al., 1989). The buffer 
is removed and replaced with 50-75 μl/cm2 fresh hybridization buffer plus 2.5 nM of 
the covalently cross-linked oligonucleotide-alkaline phosphatase conjugate with the 
nucleotide sequence complementary to the universal primer site (UP-AP, Bio-Rad). 
The blots are hybridized for 20-30 min at 45° C. and post hybridization washes are 
incubated at 45° C. as two 10 min washes in 6M urea, 1× standard saline citrate 
(SSC), 0.1% SDS and one 10 min wash in 1× SSC, 0.1% Triton®X-100. The blots are 
rinsed for 10 min at room temperature with 1× SSC.  
[*ZTC: This is the second-step hybridization mentioned in the above comment.] 
Blots are incubated for 10 min at room temperature with shaking in the substrate 
buffer consisting of 0.1M diethanolamine, 1 mM MgCI2, 0.02% sodium azide, pH 
10.0. Individual blots are placed in heat sealable bags with substrate buffer and 0.2 
mM AMPPD (3-(2'-spiroadamantane)-4-methoxy -4-(3'-phosphoryloxy)phenyl-1,2-
dioxetane, disodium salt, Bio-Rad). After a 20 min incubation at room temperature 
with shaking, the excess AMPPD solution is removed. The blot is exposed to X-ray 
film overnight. Positive bands indicate the presence of BRCA1.  
[*ZTC: As described in my comment above, the AMPPD solution that is added to the blot 
will be activated by the labels attached to the secondary probes that have annealed with the 
vector DNA. The blot will contain meaningful amounts of the vector DNA (thus also 
secondary probes) only if the patient sample DNA immobilized in the medium also contains 
the gene of interest that the primary probe would have annealed to. Thus, positive bands on 
the X-ray film means that the patient sample DNA contains BRCA1. Note that while various 
                                                
63 Annette Tumolo and others, ‘Detection of DNA on Membranes with Alkaline Phosphatese-Labeled Probes 
and Chemiluminescent CSPD Substrate’ in Larry J. Kricka (ed), Nonisotopic Probing, Blotting, and Sequencing (2nd 
edn Academic Press, 1995), p.154 et seq. 
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stages of this test are controlled by claims over individual molecules, if it were combined to be 
commercialized as a product (a kit), the overall test would be covered by Claim 19. ] 
After establishing the centrality of gene patents in genetic diagnostic tests, lets move on to the 
scope of this paper and what will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
V. Outline of This Paper 
 
This paper will explore the limits of substantive patent law in addressing gene patents, 
focusing specifically on how the European substantive patent law under the European Patent 
Convention and the Biotechnology Directive under the EU law deals with the patentability of 
genetic sequences. As the evolution of patent law in dealing with gene patents stems from the 
patent law’s treatment of biotechnological inventions before finally reaching genetic 
sequences, some portion of the paper will deal with patentability of biotechnological 
inventions in general. The goal of this paper is to trace the evolution of the interpretations of 
the definitions of substantive patentability requirements of patentable subject matter, novelty, 
inventive step, industrial applicability and sufficiency of disclosure in the case law in the 
boards of the European Patent Organisation and of the European Court of Justice with 
regards to patents on biotechnological inventions and specifically concerning genetic 
material.  
 
The result of this inquiry aims to demonstrate the potential the European Patent Convention 
and the Biotechnology Directive under the EU law in dealing with the gene patents that are 
important for the viability of personalised medicine, which is largely based on genetic 
diagnostic tests. In this quest, the paper aims to answer the following questions: (1) What 
objective does the law try to achieve in the design of the European patent law? (2) How has 
the law evolved since the1980s in dealing with the biotechnological inventions i.e. gene 
patents? (3) After the gene patent challenge, does the design of the law achieve its desired 
impact? (4) What are the shortcomings of the European Patent Convention with regards to 
gene patents? (5) After the enactment of the Biotechnology Directive, what are the 
implications of the way the European Patent Office and the European Court of Justice is 
willing to treat gene patents for the future of genetic inventions? My hope is that this paper 
will serve to contribute to the literature by providing a text where the reader can find the state 
of the art in the legal field concerning gene patents, but also presenting an overview (in detail 
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that surpasses what is found in most legal contributions) of how exactly these legal rules 
interact with the science and technical developments that underlie the development of new 
advanced healthcare applications that we have started to encounter in our daily lives. 
 
To achieve the stated aim, in Part A, an account of the concept of personalised medicine was 
given, and the issues surrounding the concept and political action whose goal is to incentivise 
its development was demonstrated. A primer on the scientific background was given for the 
convenience of the reader who is not familiar with the relevant concepts. Finally, the 
centrality of gene patents to proprietary control over genetic diagnostic tests was showed by 
way of an example gene test. Part B focuses on the relevant scientific and technological 
developments that gave rise to inventions that have challenged the substantive patent laws 
and more specifically how the U.S. patent law responded to these challenges. First, an 
account of biotechnology and biotechnological inventions are given. After establishing the 
importance of U.S. patent law for a Europe focused paper, a primer on U.S. patent law is 
given, and then the evolution of the relevant turning points in science are discussed alongside 
with the most relevant landmark cases in the U.S.. Part C focuses on how the substantive 
European patent law under the European Patent Convention and the Biotechnology 
Directive responds to the challenges posed by gene patents. After discussing the history and 
justifications for patent law, first the substantive patentability requirements concerning gene 
patents under the European Patent Convention will be discussed, and finally the overarching 
concept of industrial applicability under the Biotechnology Directive will be examined. The 
final Part D will conclude this paper by briefly looking at options (other than the overarching 
concept of industrial applicability under the Biotechnology Directive) of a compulsory 
licensing, a broader experimental use exception, and a potential sui generis gene right that 
might be useful in preventing issues resulting from gene patents that was discussed in Part C. 
Finally, I will conclude this paper by providing an introduction into the new CRIPSR 
technology that might further challenge the existing legal frameworks.  
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B. HISTORY OF PATENTING GENETIC MATERIAL AND THE U.S. 
EXPERIENCE 
 
I. Introduction: General Starting Points 
 
Biotechnology is “any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, 
or derivates thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.”64 The 
development of biotechnology can be divided into two periods65: (1) “Traditional 
biotechnology”, when applied biology was used to produce food, cultivate plants and dispose 
waste66; and (2) “innovative or advanced biotechnology”, which starts with the discovery of 
the structure of the DNA in 195367 and later followed by the advance of genetic 
engineering.68 As our understanding of biology expands, biotechnology too continues to 
evolve. Today, with new CRISPR technology69, we might witness the beginning of a third 
period.   
 
Biotechnology is very important for the health sector. Currently, most of biotechnological 
research is for the development of personalised medicine rather than development of new 
drugs.70 As introduced in the previous part, for the development of personalised medicine, 
securing gene patents are important for the sustainability of the industry.71 A ‘gene patent’ 
can be described as a patent claiming “a specific and isolated genetic sequence, its chemical 
composition, the process used to obtain or use it, or combination of these.”72 The demand by 
the industry for developing personalised medicine applications, further complicated the way 
patent law (national, regional, and international) deals with gene patents.  The increased 
demand for gene patents intensified these complexities, which can be summarised under two 
headings: (1) Are biotechnological inventions, and more specifically gene patents for the 
purposes of this paper, patent eligible under current substantive patentability requirements?; 
and (2) is it ethical to patent genetic material?  
                                                
64 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June1992, 31 ILM 818, Article 2.  
65 Andrea Stazi, Biotechnological Inventions and Patentability of Life. The US and European Experience. (Edward Elgar, 
2015), p.2. 
66 Ibid. 
67 James D. Watson and Francis H. Crick, ‘A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid’ (1953) 171 Nature 737. 
68 Stazi (n.65), p.2. 
69 See section titled ‘CRISPR and the Future’ in Part D below.  
70 Stazi (n.65), p.8. 
71 See example gene test in Part A above. 
72 Stazi (n.65), p.6. 
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Although the main focus of this paper is the European response to these legal complexities 
concerning gene patents73, it is important to also consider how the U.S. has responded to the 
challenge posed by the gene patents. This is because in order for Europe to compete with the 
U.S. (and also with its other major trading partners) at the global level, it is important to have 
equivalent protection granted to such inventions.74 It is also important to note that the U.S. is 
the cradle of the biotechnological industry. Therefore, before continuing on to the European 
substantive patent law in the following part, I will briefly introduce the major turning points 
in history, both legally and scientifically, in the following sections. But first, lets move on to a 
very brief introduction to U.S. patent law, as this primer will be helpful in explaining the 
major landmark cases in the U.S., which eventually resulted in the patenting of genetic 
material both in the U.S. and in Europe. 
 
II. A Primer to U.S. Patent Law 
 
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (henceforth USPTO) reviews duly filed patent 
applications by assessing whether they have fulfilled five requirements. These requirements 
are patentable subject matter75, utility76, novelty77, non-obviousness78 and disclosure79. For 
the purposes of this section and the later comparison with the European industrial 
applicability requirement in the following part, the remaining substantive patent law 
requirements of novelty, non-obviousness and disclosure/enablement stay outside the scope 
of this section.  
 
i) Eligibility, or Patentable Subject Matter 
 
The invention for which patent protection is sought must fall under patentable subject matter 
as set forth in Section 101 of the U.S. Code Title 35, which stipulates: 
 
                                                
73 See Part C below. 
74 Stazi (n.65), pp.17-18. 
75 35 U.S.C. §101. 
76 Ibid. 
77 35 U.S.C. §102. 
78 35 U.S.C. §103. 
79 35 U.S.C. §112. 
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“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.” 
 
Although the scope of patentable subject matter under U.S. law has historically varied due to 
the changing jurisprudence of courts and the evolution of dominant positions in Anglo-
American intellectual property law theory, the development in the law that took place 
beginning in the 1980s is the most relevant for the subject of this paper.80  
 
In early 1980s, the way already opened by Supreme Court’s (henceforth SCOTUS) Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty81 decision in 1980, and abandoning former patent eligibility doctrines, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (henceforth CAFC) relaxed the scope of patent 
protection considerably.82,83 The SCOTUS did not rule on the matter of patentable subject 
matter in the period between 1981-2010, until the liberal ‘anything-under-the-sun’ eligibility 
regime was somewhat limited by the SCOTUS decisions in Bilski v. Kappos84; Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Labs. Inc.85; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.86; and Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l87.88  
 
Generally, courts have treated the eligibility requirement as a preliminary condition, rather 
than a full-fledged substantive test, for an invention to be considered for patent protection.89 
The eligibility requirement and its conceptualisation as a preliminary condition have had 
important implications for biotechnological inventions. The prohibition against granting 
patent protection for ‘products of nature’ finds its basis in the eligibility condition, and 
whether this condition should be considered as a broad preliminary ‘entry test’ to the patent 
                                                
80 Mark A. Lemley, Peter S. Menell, Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in the Technological Age (Vol.1 Clause 8 
Publishing, 2016), pp.III-123-128. 
81 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
82 Lemley (n.80), pp.III-123-128. 
83 See the following section 3(9)(a) below on Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 
84 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
85 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
86 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
87 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).  
88 Lemley (n.80), p.III-123. Also recently the scope of patentable subject matter has been limited with statute for 
the first time in U.S. history with the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) which expressly prohibits patents 
on tax strategies and human organisms. Ibid. 
89 Philippe G. Ducor, Patenting the Recombinant Products of Biotechnology and Other Molecules, (Kluwer Law 
International, 1998), p.6. 
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system, or a more substantial test in its own right has been a critical issue in the debate 
surrounding the permissible width of gene patent claims under U.S. patent law. Under U.S. 
patent law, the prohibition against the protection of products of nature essentially requires an 
intervention to be done to the natural state of the subject matter of the claim for the claim to 
be patent eligible. In one of the early precedents on patentable subject matter and the 
product of nature doctrine, the court held in the Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co.90 that:  
 
“[…] patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature. […] The 
qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, 
are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of 
laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers 
a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it 
which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must 
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end’.”91 
 
From this requirement for an intervention stems the importance of isolation and purification 




The utility requirement in Section 101 (“any new and useful process”) is currently framed by 
the SCOTUS decision in Brenner v. Manson93, and the subsequent CAFC decision in in re 
Brana.94 The SCOTUS decision in Brenner v. Manson was a reaction to the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals (henceforth CCPA)95 decisions in in re Manson,96 and the earlier in re 
Nelson97 which virtually rejected an autonomous utility test in the patentability assessment.98  
 
                                                
90 333 U.S. 127 (1948) 
91 Ibid at 130. 
92 Ducor (n.89), p.6. 
93 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
94 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
95 The CCPA (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) was a U.S. federal court that had jurisdiction over appeals 
from the Patent Office in patent and trademark cases. The CCPA was abolished in 1982 and its duties were 
taken over by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Judicial Center (FJC) ‘U.S. Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, 1929-1982’ (FJC Website) <https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-court-
customs-and-patent-appeals-1929-1982> accessed 1 September 2017. 
96 333 F.2d 234 (CCPA 1964). 
97 280 F.2d 172 (CCPA 1960). 
98 Ducor (n.89), p.7. 
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In Brenner v. Manson, Manson’s patent application covered a novel method to produce a 
chemical compound which itself did not have a precise known use, but whose chemical 
homologues were deliberated in scientific literature to have potential uses. The SCOTUS 
ruled that the utility requirement for a chemical process is not satisfied by merely showing 
that serious research and investigation were being conducted for potential use, and that 
chemical processes do not fulfil the utility requirement by virtue of the fact that they yield the 
intended end product.99  
 
The strict retrenchment of the utility requirement that came about with the SCOTUS 
decision was moderated in the context of pharmaceuticals in the following CCPA decisions 
that allowed lower thresholds for demonstrating utility; in the 1970s, after the SCOTUS 
decision, animal testing was deemed sufficient to assert use in humans, progressively in vitro 
assays instead of in vivo testing in animals were allowed as proof of utility.100 In the 1980s, the 
CCPA decision in Nelson v. Bowler101 and the CAFC decision in Cross v. Iizuka102 effectively 
eliminated the animal experiment requirement by allowing the demonstration of any 
pharmaceutical activity to be sufficient proof of utility, rendering (respectively) the 
demonstration of pharmaceutical effect on an isolated tissue, and the mere in vitro 
demonstration of enzymatic inhibition sufficient to prove utility.103 In light of the Nelson v. 
Bowler and Cross v. Iizuka decisions, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures of the 
USPTO was updated to reflect the new standard, however despite this change and 
supporting court decisions many USPTO examiners kept applying an excessively strict utility 
test, including in the field of biotechnology.104 This lead to the CAFC decision in re Brana that 
reversed a USPTO Board decision by asserting the standard set by the two former decisions, 
and prompted an update of the USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines in 1995 following 
the CAFC’s calls for caution and evidence from public hearings.105 However, in light of 
public comments that suggested that the revised guidelines allowed examiners grant patents 
                                                
99 Brenner v. Manson (n.93). The Court found that: “The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and 
the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with 
substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point -- where specific benefit exists 
in currently available form -- there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may 
prove to be a broad field.” Ibid at 534-535. 
100 Ducor (n.89), pp.8-9. 
101 626 F.2d 853 (CCPA 1980). 
102 Cross v. Iizuka 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ducor (n.89), p.10. 
105 Ibid; Kshitij Kumar Singh, Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Rights: Legal and Social Implications (Springer, 
2015), p.56. 
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with unspecific or unsubstantial utility, the Guidelines were further updated in 2000 (entered 
into force in 2001), adding an additional ‘substantial utility’ requirement to remedy the 
situation.106 In 2005, the CAFC approved the final version of the revised USPTO Guidelines 
in in re Fisher.107 Finally in 2014, the USPTO issued a guidance on the patent eligibility of 
genes after the SCOTUS decision in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (2013) 
(superseding an earlier memorandum also concerning Myriad).108 
 
Now lets move on to the history of patenting genetic material and the evolution of the 
relationship between the U.S. patent law through U.S. landmark decisions. 
 
III. History of Gene Patenting: The Turning Points109 
 
The advent of two new technologies in the second half of the 20th century, i.e. the discovery 
of the double helix of DNA and the invention of semiconductor chips, gave rise to inventions 
concerning biotechnology and computer science.110 The rules and doctrines of patent laws in 
the U.S. and Europe were challenged by these new technologies with regard to their ability to 
grant patents to such new inventions. Moreover, as new industries stemmed from these new 
technologies, and these new industries became the new driving forces in the national and 
global economies, patent applications of such new inventions grew proportionately.111 For 
example, since the mid-20th century, the advancing knowledge in molecular biology created 
two new industries, i.e. biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.112 According to Sherkow and 
Greely, “these industrial developments could not exist without supporting legal structures.”113  
 
Without new guidance explicitly addressing these new inventions, the patent offices continued 
to apply the existing rules and doctrines in a flexible way to accommodate the patentability of 
these new inventions. This gave rise to debate on whether patent law rules and doctrines 
                                                
106 Marta Diaz Pozo, Patenting Genes: The Requirement of Industrial Application, (Edward Elgar, 2017), p.46. 
107 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
108 Tug Ingram, ‘Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.: The Product of Nature Doctrine 
Revisited’ (2014) 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 385, pp.414-415.  
109 For a more detailed overview see, Luigi Palombi, Gene Cartels: Biotech Patents in the Age of Free Trade, (Edward 
Elgar, 2009), pp.226-274. 
110 Hugh B. Wellons and others, Biotechnology and the Law (American Bar Association, 2007), p.2. 
111 Jacob Sherkow and Henry Greely, ‘The History of Patenting Genetic Material’ (2015) 49 Annual Review of 
Genetics 161, p.161.  
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should apply differently to different technologies.114 Nonetheless, broader interpretations of 
the existing patent laws caused public and legal debate. Patentability of these inventions were 
challenged under two main questions: (1) Are they patent-eligible under the current patent 
laws and doctrines?115 (2) Are they patent-worthy?116 Inventions stemming from 
biotechnology have been given the most exceptions in terms of patentability because it has 
long been argued by the biotechnology industry that otherwise they would not be able to 
mitigate the financial risks associated with biotechnological research and development, 
sustain their businesses, and continue investing.117  
 
For the purposes of this paper, among all the biotechnological inventions, our focus will be on 
the patentability of claims concerning the composition of isolated genes and process claims 
that are based on defined sequences, which are central to personalised medicine applications 
based on genetic testing. The centrality of these types of claims is demonstrated in the 
previous part.118 Moreover, for the purposes of this section, we will focus on the evolution of 
the patentability of genes under the U.S. patent law, before we move on to the European 
response to gene patents in the next part. The debate on the patentability of genetic 
sequences seems to be resolved in the U.S. after the SCOTUS ruling in the case of Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics119 (henceforth the Myriad (US) case) where the Court held 
that isolated genetic material that is identical to the naturally occurring genetic sequence is 
unpatentable.120,121 The history leading to Myriad (US) is important for understanding the 
                                                
114 For an in-depth account of this issue, see Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, ‘Is Patent Law Technology 
Specific?’ (2002) 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155; and Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent 
Law’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 1575. 
115 Question of “patent-eligibility” concerns whether the subject matter of the application is a patentable 
invention under the relevant patent law. For example, in Europe, as part of the European Patent Convention, 
this requirement is regulated by Article 52 and Article 53 of the European Patent Convention, and in EU law by 
the Biotechnology Directive. In the U.S., as explained in the previous section, the common practice of the 
USPTO is that an invention is not patentable if it is a product of nature. Concerning biotechnological 
inventions, the U.S., the product of nature exception meant that the product was not patentable unless it was 
“isolated and purified from the surrounding environment”. (See Parke Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co. 189 F. 95 
(1911)) This principle encouraged patenting of isolated genetic sequences until the SCOTUS decision in the case 
of Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., where the Court held that isolated genes are not patentable. 
In Europe, both under the European Patent Convention and the Biotechnology Directive, genetic sequences are 
still patentable. (See Part C below.) 
116 Question of “patent-worthiness” concerns whether the patent eligible invention meets certain substantive 
patentability requirements. In the U.S., these requirements are novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and sufficient 
disclosure. In Europe, under the European Patent Convention, these requirements are similarly novelty, 
inventive step, industrial applicability and sufficient disclosure.  
117 Sherkow (n.111), p.164. 
118 See example gene test in Part A above. 
119 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
120 Ibid at 2119. 
121 The decision and reasoning of the SCOTUS will be discussed in the later in this section.  
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boundaries of both the legal debate and the public debate. Additionally, given the growth of 
personalised medicine applications, understanding this history may help guessing what may 
come next for the patentability of genetic inventions.  
 
Timeline of the Scientific, Technological and Legal Developments122 
 
The scientific (and the resulting technological) developments in molecular biology changed 
the scope of patent applications. Patent applications evolved from claiming inventions 
concerning small molecular compounds to complex proteins to entire genes. 
Correspondingly, the legal debate was shaped with the public reaction to patenting living 
material. Lets now move on to a summary of the central scientific and technological 
developments and the following legal developments in the U.S. eventually leading to the 
practise of the allowing patentability of isolated human DNA, and then recently overturning 
it.123  
 
(1) “The products of nature” doctrine: The patentable subject matter doctrine 
prohibits the inventions concerning “natural laws, phenomena, or products, or abstract ideas” 
to be patent eligible.124 Early cases in the 19th century interpreting this doctrine did not grant 
patents to such inventions of the products of nature.125  
 
(2) Race to isolate epinephrine (also known as adrenaline) between 1895-
1904: After the extracts of the adrenal gland were obtained in 1895, there was a race to 
isolate and purify the epinephrine (or adrenaline) hormone extracted from the adrenal gland. 
Finally in 1904, the hormone was first synthesized in a laboratory.126 
 
(3) Patentability of “isolated or purified” natural products in 1911: In 
1901, the American pharmaceutical firm Parke-Davis & Co. obtained a patent on adrenaline. 
The validity of this patent was challenged in court on the ground that adrenaline was a 
                                                
122 For more information see Sherkow (n.111). 
123 In the following timeline, the central scientific and technological developments are underlined and in italics, 
the legal and social developments are in bold.   
124 Sherkow (n.111), p.164; Rebecca Eisenberg, ‘The story of Diamond v Chakrabarty: Technological 
change  and the subject matter boundaries of the patent system’ in Jane Ginsburg and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss 
(eds), Intellectual Property Stories (Foundation Press, 2005), p.334. 
125 For example, see the case of Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123.  
126 Kara Rogers, ‘Epinephrine’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica 
<https://www.britannica.com/science/epinephrine#toc329394> accessed on 26 September 2017. 
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product of nature. In the case of Parke Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co (1911).127, Judge 
Learned Hand held the patent valid on the ground that the claimed adrenaline was ‘isolated 
and purified from its natural surroundings’ and thus it was ‘not a product of nature’. This principle later 
used in the patenting of early genetic material.  
 
(4) The discovery of the structure of DNA double helix in 1953: James 
Watson and Francis Crick discovered the molecular structure of DNA in 1953.128 Following 
this discovery, several patents were granted for nucleotide derivatives in the 1950s and 
1960s.129  
 
(5) Increased patenting of products of biology in the 1960s: For example, 
one patent in 1969 claimed one strain of a rapidly reproducing RNA.130 However, few of 
these patents were commercialised and enforced against infringers.131  
 
(6) The discovery of reverse transcriptase in 1970:132 Reverse transcriptase is 
an enzyme that is used in genetic engineering for the formation of double-stranded DNA 
(cDNA) using the single stranded RNA (mRNA) as template.133,134  
 
(7) The development of the recombinant DNA technology in 1973:135 In 
1973, Stanley Cohen and Herbert Bayer developed recombinant DNA technology.136 
Recombinant DNA technology is used in genetic engineering in order to introduce genes 
from one source into another for creating genetically modified organisms.137,138 
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(8) The first successful sequence of a full DNA molecule in 1977. 139 
 
(9) Turning Points in 1980: Four consequent events marked the beginning of 
commercialisation of products of molecular biology:  
 
a. Diamond v. Chakrabarty140,141 (June 16, 1980): The SCOTUS decision in Diamond v 
Chakrabarty marks the start of a new era in patent law concerning biotechnological inventions. 
In 1972, microbiologist Ananda Chakrabarty (working in the General Electric Company at 
the time) applied for a patent142 for oil-eating bacteria he created.143 The patent claims 
included both the process of producing the bacteria and surprisingly also for the bacterium 
itself.144 Although the claims for the process of constructing the bacteria were not 
problematic145, the claims on the bacteria turned this application into a landmark case.  
 
At first, the USPTO refused the patent on the ground that bacterium was a product of 
nature146. The SCOTUS, on the contrary, held that this artificially created bacterium was a 
patentable invention with utility147 because the oil-eating bacterium was a “manufacture” or 
a “composition of matter” within the meaning of §101148. Rebecca Eisenberg explains this 
change of attitude as: “By the time the issue was presented to the Supreme Court, the anxiety 
surrounding genetic engineering in the 1970s had begun to subside, and medically important 
genes had been cloned in microorganisms. The commercial potential of biotech had become 
manifest, and a host of amicus curiae briefs from the scientific community urged the court to 
uphold the patentability of genetically engineered microorganisms.”149 Moreover, quoting an 
earlier statement made in Congress, the SCOTUS held that “anything under the sun made 
                                                
139 F. Sanger and others, ‘Nucleotide sequence of bacteriophage phi X174 DNA’ (1977) 265 Nature (5596) 687. 
140 447 U.S. 303. 
141 For an excellent analysis of the case see: Matthew Rimmer, Intellectual Property and Biotechnology: Biological 
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by man”150 was patentable subject matter.151 The main argument of the SCOTUS was 
twofold152: (1) “Courts should not read into the patent law limitations and conditions, which 
the legislature has not expressed”153; and (2) “rule that unanticipated inventions are without 
protection would conflict the core concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines 
patentability.”154 In conclusion, setting the limits of patentable subject matter is the duty of 
Congress, and the Court believed Congress had already authorised patents for anything 
under the sun made by man.155  Justice Burger, who delivered the majority opinion, also 
stated that the SCOTUS did not have the competence to examine the moral consequences of 
genetic engineering because that issue involved balancing competing values and interests. 
Hence, the issue was a matter for policy and needed to be resolved by the legislative.156 This 
new doctrine paved the way for the later patent grants to animals, plants, and finally to human 
genes.  
 
After the decision, although the SCOTUS urged Congress to take action concerning limits to 
patentable subject matter, Congress took no action.157 Additionally, as it was evident that the 
SCOTUS was unwilling to affirm rejections to patentability of certain subject matter, this 
urged the USPTO to grant patents to similar inventions.158 As the patents were not 
challenged on the grounds of invalidity, the only remaining way to challenge a grant was 
through infringement proceedings.159 However, as the infringing defendants were commonly 
the competitors in the biotech industry, rather than challenging the patents on the patentable 
subject matter (because if they did so, their own patents would also be at risk), they challenged 
the patents on obviousness.160 Lastly, after the decision, many companies started to apply for 
patents on their inventions that they were previously protecting via trade secrets.161 This shift 
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increased the dissemination of information and further contributed to the growth of the 
industry.162 
 
b. Genentech Inc.’s Public Offering (October 14, 1980): Genentech, a biotechnology 
company, filed for a patent application in 1979 concerning production of mammalian 
hormones including human insulin hormone.163 When it offered one million shares valued at 
$35 each in the following year, on the first day of trading, the value for one share reached 
$88.164 By the end of the day, the value of Genentech increased from $36million to $532 
million.165 This historic appreciation and profitability of Genentech was featured in Time 
Magazine in March 1981, with the headline “Shaping Life in the Lab: The Boom in Genetic 
Engineering”. This immediately caught the attention of the potential investors into the 
biotechnology industry.166  
 
c. First recombinant DNA patent (December 2, 1980): Stanley Cohen and Herbert 
Bayer were granted a patent for their invention of recombinant DNA technology.167  
 
d. Bayh-Dole Act (December 12, 1980): Before, any invention created with federal 
funding was at least partially owned by the federal government, and this discouraged 
universities and research institutions from investing into further research of applied sciences 
because they would not be able to commercialise their inventions.168 With the Bayh-Dole Act, 
universities and research institutions could become patent owners of their own inventions, so 
they were encouraged for more research and development.169  
 
(10) “Anything under the sun made by man” doctrine: Following the 
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the “anything under the sun made by man” is patentable 
era had begun.  
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(11) The first gene patent granted in 1981170  
 
(12) The race to map the human genome 1990-2003: Until the announcement 
of the Human Genome Project (henceforth HGP), more than 1000 patents were granted to 
inventions claiming genes or genetic sequences, but only a few of them were patents claiming 
full-sequence human genes.171 The objective of the HGP was to sequence all of the 
nucleotides to determine the functions of all human genes.172 After the announcement of the 
publicly funded HGP, privately funded Celera Genomics joined the race to map the human 
genome. During the race, a debate began concerning the patentability of the short sequences 
of an expressed gene called “expressed sequence tags i.e. ESTs” used in sequencing. Although 
ESTs were held to be unpatentable on the ground of lacking utility in the case of In re 
Fisher173, the issue of whether gene sequences were patentable or not still remained to be 
unresolved.174 Consequently, after the completion of the HGP, thousands of patent 
applications claiming inventions concerning isolated human genes were filed.175  
 
(13) Increasing reactions to patenting of human biological material: 
Following the case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California176, when a patent was granted 
to an abnormal human cell line (Mo cells) from the spleen of a patient (John Moore) without 
the knowledge of the patient, the patient sued the patent holder for holding someone else’s 
property.177 Although these claims were rejected by the Supreme Court of California, the 
case attracted intense public concern over the patenting of human body.178  
 
(14) Intense Public Debate on the Patentability of Genes in 2000s179: 
Although the USPTO has been patenting genes since 1980s, by early 2000s this practice has 
begun to be challenged by many public voices. In 2002, the UK-based Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics published a discussion paper titled “The Ethics of Patenting DNA”. In another 
paper by Jon Merz and Mildred Cho in 2005, aggressive patent strategies, of those companies 
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like Myriad, were heavily criticized for obstructing research and health care.180 By 2006, the 
broader public started to be involved in the debate. In 2006, famous writer Michael Crichton 
published his new book Next, criticizing unwanted consequences of corporate greed in genetic 
research; and in 2007 penned an op-ed titled “Patenting Life” in the New York Times.181,182 
In the U.S. Congress, a bill, HR 977, called “Genomic Research and Accessibility Act” 
prohibiting patenting of nucleotide sequences was introduced, but failed. 
 
(15) The Myriad (US) Experience:183 Myriad Genetics illustrates the evolution of 
the biotechnology industry. When Dr. Mark Skolnick and Nobel laureate Walter Gilbert 
founded Myriad Genetics in 1993, their business strategy was to focus on finding genes for 
diseases like cancer and developing genetic tests for individuals, rather than focusing on the 
development of new pharmaceuticals for treatment. This new business model meant growth 
in the market, because rather than targeting individuals looking for certain treatments, they 
now could offer their services to general public looking only for information on their 
likelihood of developing certain diseases.184 In 1994, Myriad was able to isolate the location of 
the genes BRCA1185 and BRCA2186 and immediately upon discovery, it applied for product 
patents on the genes themselves. There are several statements by Myriad illustrating the vital 
role of acquiring such gene patents.187 
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Following the publication of the scientific papers188 on the discovery of BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes, Myriad filed patent applications concerning, among others, claims on the isolated 
sequences of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and their cDNAs. In accordance with the doctrines 
of patenting of products of nature if “isolated and purified from the surroundings” and 
“anything under the sun made by man is patentable”, the patents189 were issued in 1998. 
Shortly after the grant, Myriad began to aggressively enforce its patents against clinicians and 
researchers. This stirred public concerns on the validity of patents held by Myriad on the 
grounds of their interference with scientific research, impact on patient access to treatment 
(because of the high costs of commercial genetic testing), and the administration of health 
care.190 Sherkow and Greely point out that as a result of Myriad’s aggressive patent 
enforcement strategy, Myriad became “the scapegoat” for gene patenting.191 There were 
many other companies holding gene patents since 1980s, but none of the other gene patent 
holders enforced their patents as aggressively as Myriad.192,193 It was the aggression of Myriad 
and the fact that the patents under issue concerned one of the most common diseases 
worldwide that attracted wider public’s attention towards gene patenting and finally brought 
the problem of gene patenting to the courts.194 The Federal District Court ruled against 
Myriad, and held the patents invalid.195 The CAFC reversed this and ruled that the genes 
were patentable. When the case reached the SCOTUS, at first, in light of its recent decision 
in Mayo v Prometheus, the SCOTUS vacated the judgment of the CAFC and remanded the 
case back to the CAFC. However, the CAFC came to the same conclusion and when the 
plaintiffs again appealed the case to the SCOTUS, they were granted a writ of certiorari on 
the question of “are human genes patentable?”. 
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What had happened in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories Inc.? 
Prometheus’s patent concerned the use of thiopurine compounds for treatment of certain 
autoimmune diseases such as Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis. Although the utility of 
thiopurine for such diseases and the relationship between the toxicity and efficacy of 
thiopurine drugs and the metabolite levels in the bloodstream of the patient metabolizing the 
drug were known in the state of art at the time the patent application was made, the exact 
correlations between the metabolite levels and physiological effects were not known.196 
Prometheus’ patent was based on its research findings regarding these correlations. 
The claims in question claimed a process where a medical practitioner administers a 
theopurine compound to a patient, and tests the level of resulting metabolite concentrations 
in the patient’s blood. The metabolite levels are then checked against upper and lower 
metabolite limits that are disclosed in the patent, and the correlations that are observed are 
used to draw conclusions as to whether the patient is reacting positively or negatively to the 
drug, directing the practitioner to make suitable adjustments to the dosage.197 
 
The Court invalidated the claims, giving three main justifications for its decision: (1) The 
‘comparing’ claims were protecting laws of nature; (2) the claims taken together did not add 
enough inventiveness to the law of nature to make the patent more than protection claimed 
simply over the law itself; and (3) the ‘adjustment’ claims merely involved “well-understood, 
routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by researchers in the field”.198 The 
Court highlighted that granting patent protection on laws of nature risk “inhibit[ing] future 
innovation premised upon them, a danger that becomes acute when a patented process 
amounts to no more than an instruction to “apply the natural law””.199 According to Richard 
H. Stern who commented in detail on the case, four issues were resolved with the judgment in 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs. Inc, namely, (1) patent-eligibility was re-emphasized 
as a preliminary inquiry in cases concerning claims applying laws of nature and abstract 
principles, (2) inhibition of future innovation remained an important policy goal in assessing 
patent eligibility, (3) mere implementations of natural laws and principles via obvious or 
conventional methods would likely be ineligible for patent protection, and (4) the Court as a 
methodology prefers to analytically dissect claims as opposed to considering them as a whole 
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when considering patent eligibility.200 According to Sherkow and Greely, Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Labs. Inc will have a greater effect than Myriad (US) on decreasing 
incentives on patenting diagnostic uses of genes.201 
 
Myriad (US) SCOTUS Decision 
Finally the SCOTUS held on June 13, 2013 that “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a 
product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA 
is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring” 202 because “separating a gene from its 
surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.”203 This seems like a balanced 
decision. On the one hand, it calmed down the public concerns over gene patenting by 
invalidating patent claims on isolated sequences204, on the other hand, by leaving claims over 
cDNAs valid, it did not kill the sustainability of the biotech industry205. However, the decision 
is also criticized for creating more uncertainty in the patenting of genetic sequences.206 
Rebecca Eisenberg notes that although the SCOTUS is the ultimate appellate jurisdiction in 
patent cases, “the Supreme Court’s sporadic interventions in the field have sometimes seemed 
like rules laid down by a noncustodial parent during weekend visits with the kids – at best, 
sparingly enforced once everyday life resumes under the supervision of someone whose 




Following the decisions in Myriad (US) (declaring claims on isolated gene sequences are 
invalid) and Mayo v. Prometheus (declaring ‘benchmarking’ method claims on genetic risk 
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assessment are invalid), the future of gene patents remains to be uncertain.208 As Myriad Inc. 
was not enforcing its patents elsewhere as aggressively as it did in the U.S., it is unclear 
whether other jurisdictions will adopt the approach of the Myriad (US).209,210 
 
Before we conclude this part, it is important to note that Myriad patents are still valid in 
Europe. They were challenged211 on the grounds for being against the ordre public and 
morality (under Article 53 of the European Patent Convention), not being novel, lacking 
inventive step and insufficiency of disclosure rather than being unpatentable subject matter 
because according to the Biotechnology Directive under EU Law, isolated sequences are 
expressly patentable.212 We now move on to an analysis of the European substantive law 
under the European Patent Convention and the Biotechnology Directive, in addressing the 
patentability of genetic sequences.  
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C. EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM’S RESPONSE TO GENE PATENTS 
 
I. Introduction: General Starting Points 
 
The complexity of the European patent system is such that some authors to call it 
byzantine213. Unlike in the U.S., what is called the European patent system does not rest on a 
singular centralised system. Its complexity stems from the presence of multiple ways for 
securing a patent, multiple sources of law and international treaties urging for harmonisation 
at the European and international level, multiple interpretations of the two main texts214 
regulating the substantive European patent system, and lack of a central authority215 setting 
precedents and providing legal clarity and certainty. This complex structure will not be 
explained nor analysed in detail in the following pages, as this is a separate and complex topic 
in itself that remains outside the aim of this section. However, it is important to note that 
European Union (henceforth EU) lawmakers’ intention to establish a Unified Patent Court is, 
inter alia, motivated by the need to alleviate this byzantine complexity.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, the responses to gene patents of the two legal texts providing 
for and regulating the substantive patent law at the European level will be analysed in detail. 
The first text is the European Patent Convention of 1973 (henceforth EPC), an international 
agreement between its contracting states in Europe, which include all the EU Member States, 
though EU is not a party this international treaty. The second text, Directive 98/44/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions216 (henceforth the Biotech Directive), is specifically designed by 
EU lawmakers to address the problems emerged in the interpretations of the EPC system vis-
à-vis the biotechnological inventions. So, for the purposes of the following sections, what is 
meant by the European patent system is the patent law under the EPC and the Biotech 
Directive.  
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The U.S. patent system and the European patent system have roots in similar justifications 
for patent grants and similar provisions in substantive patent law standards, so it can be 
expected that they would eventually operate in a similar manner. Regardless, the European 
authorities since the creation of the EPC in 1973 have aimed to harmonise the European 
patent system with the U.S. patent system as much as possible, not merely by according the 
core patentability principles with those of the U.S. patent system, but creating a competitive 
yet similar system for international trade relations. In the previous section, the U.S. approach 
to gene patentability has been explored in order to better comprehend the European patent 
system as the U.S. patent system have provided guidance for the younger European patent 
system.217 However, there are still important differences existing between the U.S. system and 
the European system that are important to make a note of. Such differences include but are 
not limited to218:  
 
(1) Intellectual property right is a constitutional right in the U.S., which means the U.S. 
Constitution creates the right, whereas it is a national right in Europe, meaning there 
is no centralised legislation or a competent central court enforcing the right.219  
(2) In the U.S., the USPTO, a centralised institution of the federal government, grants 
patents, whereas, for the European states under the EPC, the European Patent Office 
(henceforth EPO) grants the patents and the EPO is not a EU institution.220,221  
(3) Patents are important for the U.S. national policy “to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts”222 so to create new industries, whereas the policy motivation of the 
European Commission for a European patent system is to avoid barriers to trade that 
would impede the proper functioning of the internal market.223,224 The Preamble of 
the EPC states “strengthen(ing) co-operation between the States of Europe in respect 
of the protection of inventions” as one of its policy motivations.225  
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(4) The U.S. system is older, thus the U.S. patent system has been tested more than the 
European patent system.226  
(5) The U.S. courts have developed the conditions for patentability whereas in Europe 
the EPC and the Biotech Directive provides the conditions for patentability. For 
example, in the U.S., the Courts have decided what patentable subject matter are, 
whereas in Europe, only the EPC provides guidance on what patentable subject 
matter may not be – the related provision of Articles 52 has been drafted in defining 
what may be patentable in a negative manner creating complexities and uncertainties 
in determining what may be patentable. Thus, what is patentable in the U.S. law is 
clearer, which might cause patent applicants to feel more secure in the U.S..227  
(6) And finally, the European patent system has been referred to as “ask moral questions 
first, then patent”, whereas the U.S. patent system has been defined as “patent first, 
ask moral questions later.”228 
 
These points provide a brief outline of the European patent system vis-à-vis the US patent 
system and make note of the important problematic aspects of the European system.  
 
Let’s move on to the patentability criteria in the European patent system. The criteria can be 
described in a three-tiered test. The first tier preoccupies itself with the patentable subject 
matter, corresponding to the question of “is it patent eligible?” as asked previously in the U.S. 
patent system section. Here, the claimed invention in the application is evaluated under the 
negative description of patentable subject matter of Article 52 of the EPC, and inter alia, the 
morality exclusion from patentability under Article 53 of the EPC. If the application passes 
this tier, it moves to the second tier and the invention’s novelty, inventiveness and industrial 
applicability are examined. This second tier corresponds to the question of “is it patent 
worthy?” in the U.S. patent system. Finally, in the last tier, as per the disclosure requirement 
– which constitutes the main social justification for the state to granting this time-limited 
monopoly –  (i) the sufficiency of the claims enabling the performance of the invention and 
relatedly (ii) the breadth of the claims important in determining the scope of the monopoly, 
are assessed. This three-tiered patentability test is the backbone of the European patent 
                                                
226 Mills (n.218), p.6.   
227 Ibid, p.7.   
228 Stazi (n.65), p.185. 
 44 
system as it is set by the EPC and transposed into the national patent laws of its contracting 
parties.  
 
This three-tiered system poses difficulties when it is dealing specifically with gene patents. 
Although gene patents have been discussed vis-à-vis patentable subject matter (the debate on 
discovery vs. invention) and the morality of patenting genetic sequences, Cornish and others 
summarise a number of other concerns eventually resulting in including but not limited to the 
over-patenting of genetic sequences229:  
 
(1) Novelty and inventiveness requirements are interpreted very widely and a low 
threshold in both tests has been applied to patent applications concerning genetic 
material. This has been very much in the applicant’s or patentee’s favour. For early 
stages of complex new technology, it is understandable that any patent application is 
to be conceived as dramatically original and inventive to the eye of the patent 
examiner, and it is only when the examiners become increasingly familiar with the 
technology, they can start assessing the invention’s true novelty and inventiveness.230  
(2) A patent may have been granted before the invention has demonstrated its industrial 
applicability, so the scope of the monopoly granted may have been unfairly wide and 
disproportional to the invention disclosed.231 
(3) Concerns numbered (1) and (2) result in over-patenting of genetic sequences. Over-
patenting will result in a crowd of too many closely related patents to different parties, 
and this may create a ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ in the space needed to keep 
conducting research and development in genetic technologies and genomic sciences, 
and moreover, the exceptions for experimental use are too narrow. 232  
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(4) As a result of these practices, the application of current patent law to the genetic 
sequences creates too many gene patents held by too few companies and consequently 
too few genetic diagnostics tests are available for the public.233  
 
There are proposed solutions dealing with these noted concerns, namely an over-arching and 
broadened industrial applicability test proposed by the Biotech Directive, widening the scope 
of experimental use and compulsory licensing234, and the possibility of non-patent law 
solutions for genetic inventions such as through protection of genetic databases, a new sui 
generis gene right and protecting genetic inventions via trade secrets.235 Because each one of 
these could be developed into papers on their own, the main focus of this part will be on the 
over-arching industrial applicability criterion under the Biotech Directive. This paper will 
only briefly introduce a sui generis gene right proposed in the literature in Part D.  
 
To begin, it is deemed essential to understand the roots and justifications of the European 
patent system, because the essential concepts are the engines that drive the whole system, but 
because they lack clear definitions, they can only be understood by looking at the evolution of 
the system. Therefore, in the following sections, a brief history of the European patent system 
will be explored and a brief discussion of the justifications for granting patents will be 
presented.  
 
II. A Brief Historical Account of the Development of the European Patent 
System 
 
The idea of granting a monopoly in order to incentivise innovation has old roots.236 Its origins 
could be traced back to the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies 1624 in England as 
providing the statutory basis for the development of modern national patent systems that are 
currently in force.237 According to Machlup and Penrose “apart from its expression in statute 
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form, the patent system is not predominantly an English creation.”238 Also, according to 
them, “if the Statute of Monopolies has been called the Magna Carta of the rights of 
inventors, it is not because it originated patent protection for inventors but chiefly because it 
laid down the principle that only a ‘true and first inventor’ should be granted a monopoly 
patent.”239 By the end of the 18th century, two other major trading countries had statutory 
patent systems: The French Constitutional Assembly passed a patent law in 1791 and the 
Congress in the United States passed the first patent law in 1793.240 During the next half-
century, the concept of a patent system spread to other countries – e.g. Austria in 1810, 
Prussia in 1815, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1817, Sweden in 1834, Portugal in 1837 etc. 
Since then, the legal landscape of the patent system both at the international level, and more 
important for the purposes of this section, at the European level, has changed drastically.  
 
i) The Statute of Monopolies 1624 of England  
 
Since the fourteenth century, the Crown of England granted royal privileges to foreign 
craftsmen by way of letters patent.241 The prime motivation for this practice was to encourage 
foreign craftsmen to live and to practice their trade in England, so eventually the local 
population would acquire the foreigners’ skill, as a consequence the introduction of new 
industries was expected to help England’s economy to strengthen in the long run.242 
However, unlike the current patentability requirements of the modern patent system, there 
were no set of requirements for examining patent eligibility or patent-worthiness of the craft 
before issuing the letters patent. The result was the presence of arbitrary large monopolies 
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that artificially raised prices.243 Consequently, the English Parliament introduced a general 
prohibition on the grant of patents with the Statute of Monopolies in 1624 except for what is 
provided for under section 6:244 
 
“Provided that any declaration before shall not extend to any letters patent and 
grants of privilege for the term fourteen years245 or under, hereafter to be made, of 
the sole working or making of [1] any manner of new manufactures within this Realme, 
to [2] the true and first inventor and inventions of such manufactures which others at 
the time of making such letters and grants shall not use, so as [3] also they be not 
contrary to the law, or mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt 
of trade, or generally inconvenient; the said fourteen years to be accounted from the date 
of the first letters patents or grant of such privilege hereafter to be made, but that 
the same shall be of such force as they should be if this act had ever been made, 
and of none other.”246 [emphasis added] 
 
Section 6 is often regarded as “an act of economic policy” rather than “providing justice and 
reward for the intellectual efforts of the inventor”247 and as laying the foundational principles 
of patent law, which are: [1] delimiting what is patentable to “any manner of new 
manufactures”; [2] confiding the patent holder to be only “the true and first inventor” –the 
inventor was understood to be not only the one who devised the manufacture but also the one 
who imported it248; and [3] restricting the system to the boundaries of favouring public 
interest. To draw parallels with the current legal framework, the first of these three principles 
can be understood as an early positive description of today’s “invention” requirement; the 
second principle as developed into “the novelty test” with time, and the third principle as 
evolved into “the morality exception”. However, it might be misleading to trace patent law 
back to 1624 Statute of Monopolies because this creates the illusion that patent law is 
essentially timeless, unconditional and undisputed, and eventually deter any discussion for the 
legitimacy and functioning of the system.249 It is important to note that neither intellectual 
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property law as known today nor patent law existed before the mid-19th century.250 There 
were forms of intellectual property as seen under Section 6, but they were far from organised, 
distinguished and clear legal instruments.251   
 
ii) The Patent Controversy of the Nineteenth Century252 
 
The 17th century “provided no more than a germ of a functioning patent system.”253,254 For 
example, the requirement of providing a written description of the invention did not emerge 
until the 18th century and disclosing a written specification became quid pro quo for the patent 
granted.255 However, the early practice of disclosure of the invention was inefficient, 
insufficient, and often disproportionate to the protection granted.256 In the 19th century, the 
discontent with the patent system led to intense disputes on the validity of the patent 
system.257 The subject of patent reform first caught attention of the legislature in England, 
and then the subject ignited a larger debate on the existence and justification of patent 
systems across Europe.  
 
Generally, the main argument of patent abolitionists stemmed from free-trade arguments. In 
Germany, economists were almost unanimous in the disapproval of the system, in 
Switzerland, political economists declared that the principle of patent protection was 
‘pernicious and indefensible’, and in Holland, the anti-patent movement, even more than 
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elsewhere, was linked with the free-trade movement.258 However, the controversy concerning 
patent law was not a debate on free-trade movement versus protectionism; the main concerns 
were about the efficient functioning of the patent laws and the difficulties of reform. In order 
to disengage the patent system from monopoly and free trade issues, the patent advocates 
provided justifications for the system that relied on natural law, social justice and utilitarian 
theories. Eventually, the patent advocates won the debate and the victory was later evidenced 
by the subsequent actions of legislations enacting national patent statutes in the various 
countries. According to Machlup and Penrose, the best is explanation of the sudden 
disappearance of the anti-patent movement is the simultaneous weakening of the free-trade 
movement in Europe in consequence of the severe depression in the second half of the 19th 
century.259 The debate has long subsided, but the justifications employed by the patent 
advocates still have relevance because their arguments helped shape the legal foundations of 
modern patent law.260 
 
iii) Post-World War II  
 
The 20th century saw two main developments in the patent system. First, the European 
Economic Community was founded, and immediately after the creation of a single patent 
granting office, the EPO, and harmonisation of national patent standards, through the EPC, 
followed. As patents of different standards would impede intra-community trade, with the 
creation of the EPC and the EPO European nations aimed to overcome patent-related 
barriers to European trade. Additionally, foundations of a single community patent that 
would be effective throughout the then European Economic Community, an idea applied 
today in the EU as the European patent with unitary effect or simply the Unitary Patent, was 
started to be built shortly after.  
 
Secondly, the general approach to patentability shifted from restricting patents to favouring 
patents. Although many reforms took place to accommodate many criticisms of the 19th 
century debates such as the detrimental effects of granting a monopoly right261, the need for 
an accessible and efficient administration of granting a patent262, and avoiding granting 
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patents for unmeritorious inventions263, the effects of the criticisms were still evident in the 
reluctant attitude of the courts in granting patents for being contrary to public interest.264 
However, after the Second World War this reluctant attitude changed both in national courts 
and in the EPO. For example in the English case of Ethyl Corporation’s Patent265 the court stated 
that: “The climate of opinion has changed. It is now generally recognized that it is in the 
public interest to encourage inventive genius. Accordingly the modern tendency of the courts 
has been to regard patent claims with considerable favour than before.”266  
 
This change in attitude is reflected as opting for a broader interpretation of the patentability 
principles. It also coincides with the post-war economic depression, the following industrial 
boom in Europe, and the development of pharmaceutical technologies. However, the broad 
interpretation of the concept of patentable invention came at the expense of non-patentable 
discovery.267 With the development of pharmaceutical technologies, patent applications for 
chemical inventions concerning novel molecules soared both in the U.S. and Europe. For 
some time, any novel molecule whose ‘industrial applicability’ concerned further research 
purposes would be patentable and this fact also satisfied the ‘inventive step’ requirement.268 
With the advent of biotechnology, the practice of patenting early genetic material followed. 
Genetic material has been deemed patentable by way of applying the same approaches and 
the same broad interpretation to the patentability principles undertaken for the earlier 
patenting of chemical inventions concerning novel molecules. Eventually, courts both in 
Europe and the U.S. limited such broad practices in fairly recent decisions. 
  
This is as brief as one can get when explaining the history and evolution of the patent system. 
There are many detailed accounts of the history of patent law, but for the purposes of this 
paper and for the later sections, the stated turning points of this long history is sufficient.269 
These turning points in history are important in understanding the current legal framework 
with respect to patents concerning genetic inventions. It might also be thought that the past is 
irrelevant and obsolete ever since intellectual property law and more specifically patent law 
has started to interact with the new types of organic and genetic property. The challenge 
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posed by the advent of genomic technology complicated the relationship between the law and 
intangibles, generally speaking. However, rather than creating a ‘new order’ of intellectual 
property law, it might be useful to consider the evolution of the concepts in trying to 
formulate a doctrine of intellectual property that can accommodate any new type of 
intangibles created by advancing technologies.270 
 
Now, we shall briefly examine justifications for patent protection. This will be helpful when 
we move on to analyse the evolution of patentability requirements vis-à-vis genetic inventions 
under the EPC and EU law.  
 
III. Justifications for a Patent  
 
i) The nature of Intellectual Property 
 
Before moving to the specific justifications for a patent, lets briefly return to the basics of the 
intellectual property law and the nature of a patent in order to build up on the fundamental 
justifications for a patent grant. The following account is important to comprehend the 
justifications for patent law. Generally speaking, intellectual property law claims to protect 
“the finer manifestations of human achievement” and the ultimate policy shaping the 
governing rules of intellectual property law is securing the outcomes of exclusive rights 
created by intellectual property in order to uphold the quid pro quo rationale of granting patent 
protection.271 Essentially, intellectual property law aims to protect applications of ideas and 
information –in other words “the products of the human intellect”272, that are of commercial 
value.273 Furthermore, it is growing more in importance as the development of new 
technologies that depend on the exploitation of ideas and knowledge become increasingly 
crucial in securing growth in national economies and in creating leverage over other countries 
in global trade.274 Although the subject matter of different intellectual property rights cover 
the various fields of “manifestations of human achievement”, one characteristic that is shared 
by different types of intellectual property rights is that they are all negative rights i.e. they all 
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forbid third parties from doing certain things with the subject matter of the right.275 
Intellectual property gives the right holder exclusive control over the activities of others and 
the right to commercially exploit the related protected subject matter.  
 
ii) Nature of Patents 
 
According to Bently and Sherman a patent is understood today as “a limited monopoly granted 
in return for the disclosure of technical information”276 [emphasis added]. Of all the different 
types of intellectual property rights, the patent is the only intellectual property granting a true 
monopoly and the ability to charge a monopoly price to the patentee, for creating an invention 
regardless of whether the invention provides great contributions to the accumulation of 
human knowledge or just small contributions or even trivial improvements to the existing 
knowledge or to the inventions of others, as long as it has industrial value. Essentially, for the 
said reasons of the nature of a patent, a patent is potentially the most economically valuable 
yet also the most dangerous of all the intellectual property rights.277 At the core of patent law 
lies the concept of absolute exclusivity: (1) Patents confer the patentee an exclusive right to 
prevent imitators from exploiting the same invention; but at the same (2) it confers the 
exclusive right to also exclude any third party, who has independently developed the same 
invention too, from making and selling the invention.278 
 
Therefore, leaving aside the specific legal tests encoded in the legal systems for granting a 
patent, the most basic patent principles can be summarised as follows: 
 
A patent grants the patentee; 
- a limited monopoly; 
- for an invention; [Recall: Under the Statute of Monopolies 1624, an invention is 
formulated positively as a manner of new manufacture] 
- that has industrial value; [Recall: In the early patent law has been developed for the 
introduction of new crafts, i.e. new industries, into the local economy] 
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- for exchange of disclosure. [Recall: The disclosure requirement was introduced later as 
a consideration on part of the patentee as an effort to cope with the effects of 
industrialisation and increasing demand for patents and patent applications.] 
 
iii) Justifications for Patents279  
 
Despite the many conflicting theories about why people abide the law, it is common sense 
that for lawmaker and adjudicator, it is important to be aware of the values generally upheld 
in a society when distributing rights and balancing competing interests of the parties involved 
in a legal dispute. This is why theoretical accounts of intellectual property are important. 
They employ a normative role in assessing the substantive rules at play and offer a way to 
reflect and criticize these substantive rules.280 When European courts, institutions, and 
administrative bodies engage in teleological, systemic and purposive interpretation of the 
substantive law(s), the issue of whether their assessment coincides with the common values of 
the European societies is commonly raised.281 For this reason, we will now very briefly touch 
upon the main theories that justify intellectual property. We will then look closely at whether 
or not the current biotechnological patenting legal framework employs any of these values 
and justifications in the following section. It is important to note that although each theory 
has a good share of criticism, this will not be addressed for the purposes of this paper. 
 
a. Natural Law Theories 
 
Natural law theories can stem from two different premises:  
 
(1) Creation of any type of tangible and intangible property including intellectual 
property is an extension of the personality of the creator; thus, it is a manifestation of 
the creator’s personhood.282 As Hegel states: “A person must give to his freedom an 
external sphere, in order that he may reach the completeness implied in the idea.”283  
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(2) A person has natural property in her own ideas because of the labour involved in the 
creation of the intellectual product. As Locke states: “Whatsoever then he removes out 
of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, 
and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby he makes it his property.”284 
Therefore, as the creator mixes her labour, and she invests his time, money, energy in 
developing an intellectual product, natural theorists argue that the creator should be 
rewarded with proprietary rights to the product.  
 
b. Justice or Fairness Theories 
 
According to these theories, justice requires that a person receives reward for his services in 
proportion to his invention’s usefulness to the society and it is the moral duty of the society to 
secure a just reward for the useful services of the inventor and to prevent free riders to benefit 
from another’s labour and become unjustly enriched. The most appropriate way to secure a 
just reward to inventors is by means of exclusive patent rights in their inventions.285 
 
c. Instrumentalist Theories286 
 
Utilitarian explanations for intellectual property aim to reach maximization of intended social 
benefits and eventually provide more benefits than harms to the society287 for ultimately 
encouraging certain types of social behaviour and discouraging undesirable social behaviour.  
 
Two main incentives can be discussed: 
 
(1) “The Best Incentive to Invent Argument”288: A society needs industrial progress for 
economic prosperity, and inventions are necessary to secure such progress. However, 
inventors won’t invent unless they have hopes that they can profit from their 
inventions. The simplest, the cheapest, and the most effective way for society to secure 
such a desirable behaviour of investing in inventions, is by granting exclusive patent 
rights to inventors. 
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(2) “The Best Incentive to Disclose Secrets Argument”289: A society needs industrial 
progress for economic prosperity, and inventions are necessary to secure such 
progress.  It is necessary for new inventions to be known by the general public for 
other inventors to build upon the existing technology. However, if the society grants 
no protection against imitation, the inventor will keep his invention as a secret. This is 
socially undesirable behaviour because when the secret dies with the inventor, the 
society will lose the new art. The best way to discourage this behaviour is by granting 
exclusive patent rights in exchange for public disclosure of the secret.   
 
iv) Gene Patenting in the light of Justifications for Patents 
 
The main discussion for patents revolves around the utilitarian perspective on intellectual 
property against a rights-based natural rights perspective on intellectual property. This 
discussion can be formulised as: “Should the inventors have inherent rights in their inventions or should 
the state grant them rights when they see fit?”290 Robert Merges discusses that while European 
systems chiefly advocate the natural law perspective, the U.S. system generally supports the 
utilitarian view of intellectual property.291 Peter Drahos argues that while natural rights-based 
“proprietarianism”292 advocates moral supremacy of property fundamentalism and the 
capability of owning everything293, an instrumentalist view offers to undo the damage done by 
this view. However, he argues that both in the U.S. after the “anything under the sun that is 
made by man” doctrine propagated by the 1980 SCOTUS decision in Diamond v 
Chakrabarty294, and in Europe by eventually extending the patentable subject matter protection 
to isolated human genes, the natural theorist view is the dominant theory. However, it is 
important to note that this extension of the scope of granted rights to genetic inventions also 
derive support from the instrumentalist theories, namely the public benefit of advancing the 
health sector and developing new medicines, and the dependability of the biotechnology 
sector on patents for sustainability of their investments.295 
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For example, the language of the Biotech Directive is consistent with an instrumentalist view 
of intellectual property rights. Recital 46 of the Directive describes the function of a patent as 
“to reward the inventor for his creative efforts by granting an exclusive but time-bound right, 
and thereby encourage inventive activities.” Recital 11 provides that “ […] the patent system 
should be [used] to encourage research in [the field of health].” As the instrumentalist views 
play a dominant role in the current legal framework, this suggests that the main task of patent 
offices when challenged with a new technology would be to assess the benefits against the 
costs of the patent and balancing the incentive and disincentives created by the grant.  
 
In another example, Lord Neuberger states in the UK Supreme Court decision of Human 
Genome Sciences Inc. v Eli Lilly296 concerning patentability of a genetic sequence:  
 
“[It] is worth remembering the purpose of the patent system, namely to provide a 
temporary monopoly as an incentive to innovation, while at the same time 
facilitating the early dissemination of any such innovation through an early 
application for a patent, and its subsequent publication. Although this is true in 
any sector, it has particular force in the pharmaceutical field, where even many of 
those who are sceptical about the value of intellectual property rights accept that 
there is a public interest in, and a commercial need for, patent protection.”297  
 
Even though the patentability of genetic material may be justified for instrumentalist reasons, 
there is one more question that needs to be addressed that has been discussed ever since the 
biotechnological patenting has begun: Are inventions concerning genetic material products of intellect, 
i.e. an invention? As noted previously, intellectual property law, including patents, claims to 
protect the finer manifestations of human achievement –the products of the intellect – and 
this is the foundational principle of any proprietary right before it can be justified. While the 
issue is not completely resolved, there are some legal responses to the question posed above. 
We will now consider four judiciary responses298 and one statutory response. 
 
In the 1969 German Federal Supreme Court case of Red Dove299, the court addressed the 
question of whether or not an invention concerning a biological method of selection and 
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breeding is a product of intellect or not. It applied the following test: in order for a natural 
force to become a patentable method, the method has to produce the exact same results in 
any number of trials it has been executed300,301. Since then, the EPO applied the same test of 
technical teaching/effect in numerous cases. Consequently, the court’s answer in this matter 
was that for the invention to be considered as a patentable intellectual product, it had to treat 
biological invention like any other mechanical method producing exactly the same product 
after each trial.  
 
In the EPO case of Howard Florey/Relaxin302 (henceforth Howard Florey) the EPO Opposition 
Division (henceforth OD) held that for the reason that the gene encoding for H2-relaxin had 
been “made available to the public for the first time”303, the invention concerning the genetic 
sequence was a product of the intellect.  
 
In contrast with these two judicial responses, in Brüstle v Greenpeace304 (henceforth the Brüstle 
case), the European Court of Justice (henceforth ECJ)305 responded the question from a 
completely different point of view and advocated that the discussion of whether biological 
inventions are patent-eligible products of the intellect should not even be in issue because any 
proprietary right in such material would indicate economic interests in that material, and any 
part of human body should never be subjected to such treatment because it would violate the 
basic fundamental values and human dignity. Here the ECJ handled the biological matter not 
as chemical substances as indicated in Red Dove and Howard Florey, but as an extension of the 
human body.  
 
Lastly, in the SCOTUS case of Myriad (US), as discussed previously, it was held that merely 
isolated genetic sequences are products of nature and are not products of intellect, thus not 
capable of any sort of proprietary protection as it would be a form of unjust enrichment.306 
 
Finally as a statutory response to the question, the Biotech Directive has taken a balanced 
stance of addressing the issue. According to Article 2(1) of the Biotech Directive, biological 
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material is defined as “material containing genetic information and capable of reproducing 
itself or being reproduced in a biological system”. Article 3(1) of the Directive stipulates that 
biotechnological patenting involves inventions “even if they concern a product consisting of 
or containing biological material or a process by means of which biological material is 
produced, processed or used” and as set forth in the following paragraph307 “biological 
material which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical process may be 
the subject of an invention even if it previously occurred in nature” [emphasis added]. 
Therefore, according to the Directive what makes the biotechnological or genetic invention 
an intellectual product worthy of proprietary protection, even if it previously occurs in nature, 
is the involvement of any technical process executed by humans.  
 
One last remaining issue to be addressed before moving on to the next section is “the triumph 
of moral reasoning”308 in the Brüstle decision. Under instrumentalist justifications for 
patentability of human biological material, including genetic sequences, the rationale is that 
for the behaviour to be encouraged there should be more benefits than harms to the society. 
In light of the ECJ’s reasoning in Brüstle, how would one reconcile the human dignity 
argument with an instrumentalist view? If commercialisation of human biological material 
were against human dignity, would this render the patentability of human biological material 
unjustified because eventually there would be more harms to the society than benefits, 
morally speaking? How would one fit a moral debate when assessing a cost-benefit type of 
analysis for the public?309 Although an inspection of possible approaches to these questions 
would be interesting, they remain outside the scope of this paper; it would suffice to 
acknowledge this side to the debate. After all, the debate of whether patent law should be free 
of a moral debate is a long and complicated one.310,311 According to some scholars312 the 
morality requirement under the EPC Article 53(a) and, later the Biotech Directive Article 
6(1), should invite an assessment of European human rights law vis-à-vis the patentability of 
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biotechnology as complementary principles because human rights law should define the limits 
of patent law in order for patent law to be recognised as “a tool fostering both private and 
public interest.”313 With the Biotech Directive, which is part of EU law, patent law has finally 
invited fundamental rights into the discussion of patentability as seen in the ECJ decision in 
the Brüstle case. The Biotech Directive addresses the issue of human dignity with respect to 
patentability of human biological material in Recital 16: 
 
“Whereas patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental principles 
safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person; whereas it is important to 
assert the principle that the human body, at any stage in its formation or 
development, including germ cells, and the simple discovery of one of its elements 
or one of its products, including the sequence or partial sequence of a human 
gene, cannot be patented; whereas these principles are in line with the criteria of 
patentability proper to patent law, whereby a mere discovery cannot be 
patented.” 
 
Although the extent of the morality exception and the test developed by the EPO over the 
years will be discussed later in the following sections, it is relevant, for the purposes of this 
section, to note here that an instrumentalist justification for human gene patenting also invites 
a moral debate of whether a gene patent should be assessed vis-à-vis human dignity.  
 
IV. Substantive European Patent Law I: European Patent Convention 
 
This section aims to explore the points where substantive patent law under the EPC falls short 
of addressing the issues specific to gene patents. After very briefly recounting the road to 
harmonization at the European level, the section will move on to the primary requirement of 
patentable subject matter and the morality exception; the secondary requirements of novelty, 
inventive step and susceptibility of industrial application; and the tertiary requirement of 
sufficiency of disclosure and the associated scope of protection. After problematic areas in all 
of these requirements are discussed, the next section will investigate how the overarching 
principle of industrial applicability under the Biotech Directive may address and resolve these 
problems in practice.  
                                                
313 Overwalle, ‘Gene Patents’ (n.312), p.885. 
 60 
 
i) European Patent Convention 1973  
 
The advent of international business and international trade called for a harmonised and 
centralised patent system in Europe.314 The first attempt at harmonisation was through the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883.315 As set forth by Article 2 
of the Paris Convention, the signatory parties agreed to the criterion of “national treatment”, 
that is the application of same patentability principles reserved for the parties’ own citizens to 
the citizen of other states.316 Pursuant to the establishment of the common European market 
with the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957, the second important 
attempt was the Strasbourg Convention in 1963.317 The Convention, for the first time, 
introduced harmonisation of the substantive patent law principles at the European level. The 
Strasbourg Convention provided for the EPC318 signed in 1973 in Munich and the 
establishment of the EPO. As the EPC aims to harmonise the substantive patent laws of the 
signatory parties, the EPO offers an easier and centralised way to obtain a bundle of national 
patents in designated contracting states.319  
 
As mentioned before, under the EPC, patentability of an invention is assessed under a three-
tiered test of requirements. Lets now move on to a discussion of each requirement with 
respect to patentability of genetic inventions.  
 
ii) Primary Patentability Requirement: Patentable Subject Matter 
 
Article 52 of the EPC sets forth the requirement for patentability as: 
  
                                                
314 Stazi (n.65), p.178. 
315 Paris Convention is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and it is the first 
international convention covering industrial property including patents, utility models, industrial designs, trade 
marks etc. It was signed on 20 March 1883 and later amended in 1900, 1911, 1925, 1934, 1958, 1967 and lastly 
in 1979. 
316 Stazi (n.65), p.179. 
317 “Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Invention” (henceforth 
the Strasbourg Convention) was signed by the Member States of the European Council in Strasbourg on 27 
November 1963. 
318 “Convention on the Grant of European Patents” was signed on 5 October 1973. In 2000, the EPC was 
extensively amended (EPC 2000) in order to modernise the European patent system in light of recent 
technological, political and legal developments and to bring the EPC into harmony with other international 
developments such as the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of 1994 
and the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) of 2000.  
319 Stazi (n.65), p.184. 
 61 
“Patentable inventions  
 
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial 
application.” [emphasis added] 
 
What this article suggests that in order to be granted patent protection, an application must 
contain (1) a patent eligible invention; and if the subject matter meets this patent eligibility 
criterion, (2) patent worthiness of the invention, i.e. novelty, inventive step and industrial 
applicability, will be assessed. Article 52 continues: 
 
“(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the 
meaning of paragraph 1:  
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;  
(b) aesthetic creations;  
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or 
doing business, and programs for computers;  
(d) presentations of information.  
 
(3) Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-matter or activities 
referred to therein only to the extent to which a European patent application or 
European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such.”[emphasis added] 
 
Accordingly, the fundamental patentability rule is that a patent is to be granted only for 
inventions. Therefore, in order to be patent-eligible an application should primarily contain an 
invention. However, the text of the EPC does not elaborate more on this. It does not provide 
for a definition of what an invention is, except for the list of patent ineligible inventions 
provided in Article 52(2) even if they are to be deemed patent worthy, i.e. fulfill the secondary 
requirement of novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability. The Article gives 
examples of what is not an invention so it sets forth a negative definition of this elusive 
concept of an invention. Moreover, it is added in Article 52(3) that these patent ineligible 
inventions would not call for patent protection to the extent that an application involves them 
as such. So what is a patent eligible invention and what is not? What does “as such” suggest for 
the sake of formulating a test distinguishing between the two? Do the listed categories of 
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ineligible inventions have anything in common to present to the patentee regarding the 
formulation of a patentable invention?  
 
It is important to note here that in the first codified text of a patentability statute, an invention 
was defined positively as “a manner of new manufacture.”320 Hence, in order to be consistent 
with the evolution of patent law, could a definition of patentable invention under the EPC, 
stem from the concept of “a manner of new manufacture”? Is it more sensible to think of an 
invention as a manufacture –something akin to the definition of patentable subject matter 
under U.S. patent law? The concept of manufacture is also linguistically more loaded with a 
higher importance given to the industrial applicability of a granted patent, which under the 
instrumentalist justifications makes sense. Even if an invention were to be defined broadly as 
an intellectual product as opposed to a product of nature, this too would be problematic 
because, as discussed in the previous section, it is debatable whether a biotechnological 
invention is essentially an intellectual product.321 
 
Additional to the discussion of what is a patentable invention, Article 53 of the EPC provides 
explicit restrictions for public policy considerations, regardless of whether or not the invention 
is both patent-eligible and patent-worthy: 
 
“Exceptions to patentability  
 
European patents shall not be granted in respect of:  
(a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to "ordre 
public" or morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely 
because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting 
States; [emphasis added]”322 
 
As with the concept of invention, the definitions and boundaries of the concepts of ordre public 
and morality (henceforth the morality exception) remain unclear.323 To sum up a patent 
                                                
320 Statute of Monopolies of 1624, Section 6. 
321 Pila (n.279), p.155.  
322 Article 53 also restricts patentability of (b) plant or animal varieties and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals; and (c) methods of surgical, therapeutic, and diagnostic treatments. As the focus 
of this paper is patentability of genes, these exclusions remain outside the scope of this section and will not be 
discussed.  
323 Pila (n.279), p.156. 
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examiner first asks the question of whether the subject matter of the application falls within 
the morality exception under Article 53 before moving on to the three-tiered requirements.324 
Patent applications concerning biotechnological inventions325 have been highly contested 
under the morality exception under Article 53 and the requirement of an invention under 
Article 52 –i.e. the question of whether such products are products of human intellect (hence 
an invention) or products of nature (hence a discovery).326 As will be discussed later, the main 
legal response at the European level has been the enactment of the Biotech Directive in 1998, 
which ostensibly aimed to clarify the patentability criteria with respect to biotechnological 
inventions.327  
 
In the following sections, first the evolution of the concept of an invention and a discussion of 
the intention of the parties of the EPC in drafting Article 52 will be addressed. This will be 
followed by an explanation of the “having a technical character” test that complements the 
negative definition of an invention under Article 52. Then, how the patent offices have 
worked with the morality exception under Article 53 will be explored. All these discussions of 
substantive law will be dealt with in relation to the patentability of biotechnological inventions 
and more specifically patentability of genetic material. The aim of the following subsection is 
to explore the ability of the EPC in addressing and resolving the issues related to the 
patentability of genetic material.  
 
a. Requirement of an Invention  
 
As Article 52(1) of the EPC confines patentability to “inventions, in all fields of technology”, 
the principle requirement of patentability is to have a patentable invention. This is 
fundamental for European patent law because the subject matter of every national patent law 
is the protection of an invention rather than a discovery. However, there is no commonly 
accepted clear distinction between a discovery and an invention in Europe. The text of the 
EPC only provides for a negative description via the inclusion of some apparent categories 
exemplifying what is not an invention, rather than a positive description of this 
                                                
324 Ibid. 
325 Products such as isolated DNA sequences that encode for proteins of pharmaceutical use, genetically 
modified plants more resistant to toxins, genetically modified animals used in medical research. Ibid. 
326 Ibid, p.157. 
327 Ibid. 
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requirement.328 The intention of the drafters was to elucidate the relationship between the 
industrial applicability and the invention.329 In the EPO Guidelines for Examination, this 
connection between what is an invention and susceptibility of industrial application is 
described as having ‘a technical effect’: 
 
“If a new property of a known material or article is found out, that is mere 
discovery and unpatentable because discovery as such has no technical effect and it 
therefore not an invention within the meaning of Art. 52(1). If, however, that 
property is put to practical use, then this constitutes an invention which may be 
patentable. [To] find a previously unrecognized substance occurring in nature is 
also mere discovery and therefore unpatentable. However, if a substance found in 
nature can be shown to produce a technical effect, it may be patentable.”330 
 
Accordingly, it can be stated that an invention must be technical, which have involved into 
the test of ‘technical effect’, which will be assessed later in this section. But before we conclude 
this part lets take a look at how the EPO defined ‘technical’.  
 
In decision of the Technical Board of Appeal of the EPO (henceforth TBA) decision in the 
case of IBM/Computer programs331 the concept of ‘technical’ was defined as having technical 
character, or providing a technical contribution. According to Bostyn in his background study 
to the European Commission332, “this approach does not not really reveal the exact meaning 
of the concept of technical, since a definition of a term using the term to be defined in the 
definition cannot be a proper explanation of the term to be explained by that very 
definition.”333 Bostyn proposes that more emphasis should be put on defining the category of 
‘a discovery’ rather than ‘an invention’:334 “A discovery, in other words, is the mere 
knowledge relative to something existing in nature, while invention implies the ability of a 
human being to use this knowledge in a technical way, the so-called ‘technical 
                                                
328 EPC, Article 52(2) and (3). 
329 Pila (n.279), p.172. 
330 EPO, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (November 2016) Part G, Chapter II-2, at 3.1, 
section titled ‘Discoveries’ <http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/guidelines.html> accessed 15 
September 2017. 
331 T 1173/97 of 1 July 1998 [2000] EPOR 219 at 226-227.  
332 S.J.R. Bostyn, Patenting DNA sequences (polynucleotides) and scope of protection in the European Union: an evaluation – 
Background study for the European Commission within the framework of the Expert Group on Biotechnological Inventions 
(European Commission, 2004). 
333 Ibid, p.12. 
334 Ibid, p.14. 
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information’.”335 This approach is similar to the product of nature doctrine in the U.S. patent 
law and additionally, it is important to notice that the Biotech Directive adopted a similar 
positive description of an invention with regards to biological matter, as set forth in Article 
3(2) as “biological matter that is isolated from its own environment or is produced through 
technical process may be the subject of invention, even if existed previously in its natural 
state.”336  
 
A common ground for the list of exceptions? 
 
The categories of excluded subject matter caused problems for the patent officials because 
they had difficulties in finding a common ground for drawing conclusions from the list. The 
negative test of Article 52(2) and (3) of the EPC evolved to be a confusing rule especially when 
examining the patentability of the inventions related to new complex technologies. As these 
categories seem arbitrary and for policy considerations337, Article 52(2) and (3) of the EPC 
faced with a lot of criticism at national courts. For example in the U.K., the Court of Appeal 
of England and Wales case of Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd338, Lord Justice Jacob explained 
his doubts regarding to the approach of the EPC:  
 
“The categories are there but there is nothing to tell you one way or the other 
whether they should be read widely or narrowly. […] Some categories are given 
protection by other intellectual property laws. […] some categories are so abstract 
that they are unnecessary or meaningless. For instance, [how] would a scientific 
theory ever be the subject of a patent claim in the first place? Einstein’s special 
theory of relativity was new and non-obvious but it was inherently incapable of 
being patented. […] There is or may be an overlap between some of the 
exclusions themselves and between them […] and the overall requirement that an 
invention be ‘susceptible of industrial application’. The overall requirement is, 
perhaps surprisingly, hardly ever mentioned in the debate about the categories of 
‘non-invention’ but it is clearly a factor lying behind some of the debate. [...] So 
one can at least confirm that no overarching principle was intended.”339  
                                                
335 Ibid. 
336 Biotech Directive, Article 3(2). 
337 Aplin (n.242), p.577. 
338 [2007] RPC 7. 
339 Ibid at 126-127. 
 66 
 
He also adds that according to the EU law tradition, exceptions are to be interpreted in a 
narrower sense.340  However, as the Article 52(2) categories are not explicitly stipulated as 
‘exceptions to the patentability’, it is uncertain that whether this tradition applies to this 
article or not.341 
 
In another opinion, this time in a U.K. House of Lords case, obiter of Lord Hoffmann in 
Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc342 stated that defining the requirement of invention with regards to 
more complex inventions which do not easily fit into the categories of excluded subject 
matter, judges should rely on assessing the secondary requirements of novelty, inventive step 
and industrial applicability rather than dismissing the invention based on intuition: 
 
“Article 52 also has no definition of an invention. It seems that the parties to the 
EPC were unable to agree upon one. […] But the reason why the parties were 
content to do without a definition was that they recognised that the question 
would almost invariably be academic. The four conditions […] do a great deal 
more than restrict the class of “inventions” which may be patented. They 
probably also contain every element of the concept of an invention in ordinary 
speech. I say probably, because in the absence of a definition one cannot say with 
certainty that one might not come across something which satisfied all the 
conditions but could not be described as an invention. […] As the four conditions 
are relatively familiar ground, elucidated by definitions in […] the jurisprudence 
of the courts and the E.P.O., it will normally be more convenient to start by 
deciding whether they are satisfied. In virtually every case this will be the end of 
the inquiry. There may one day be a case in which it is necessary to decide 
whether something which satisfies the conditions can be called an invention, but 
that question can wait until it arises. One can of course imagine cases in which the 
alleged subject-matter is so obviously not an invention that it is tempting to take 
an axe to the problem by dismissing the claim without inquiring too closely into 
which of the conditions has not been satisfied. So in Genentech Inc.'s Patent 
                                                
340 For example, this tradition of narrow interpretation can be observed in the Harvard/Onco-mouse cases. But it is 
important to note that that case involved Article 53 of the EPC, which is explicitly titled “Exceptions to 
patentability”. 
341 [2007] RPC 7 at para.12. 
342 [1997] RPC 1. 
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[1989] R.P.C. 147, 264 Mustill L.J. said, by reference to the ordinary speech 
meaning of “invention”: “You cannot invent water, although you certainly can 
invent ways in which it may be distilled or synthesised.” This is obviously right 
and in such a case it may seem pedantic to say that water fails […] because it is 
not new. Unfortunately, most cases which come before the courts are more 
difficult. Judges would therefore be well advised to put on one side their intuitive 
sense of what constitutes an invention until they have considered the questions of 
novelty, inventiveness and so forth.”343  
 
Justine Pila argues that it more reasonable to interpret the Article 52(2) and (3) in light of the 
intention of the drafters of the EPC.344 According to her, “while the exclusions are sufficiently 
diverse not to resolve to any positive definition or conception, such a conception can 
nonetheless be derived from the history and wider context of the EPC.”345 She claims that the 
main unresolved issue for the drafters of the EPC at the time was defining a clear relationship 
between inherent patentability and industrial/technical character and public policy on the 
text of the EPC.346 As this is the chief reason for the categories of excluded subject matter in 
the Article 52(2) and (3), she suggests a positive description of an invention: “The conception I 
have in mind requires a human action on the physical world producing an objectively 
discernible (material) result directed to advancing the industrial arts, where by ‘industrial 
arts’.”347 
 
Now lets move on to how the EPO case law dealt with the problem of defining an invention.  
 
Technical character test  
 
In order to respond to the problems associated with the negative description of an invention, 
as mentioned before, the EPO case law established the positive requirement of a ‘technical 
character’ or ‘technical subject matter’ test. Therefore, instead of asking if the subject matter 
of the application belongs to one of the unpatentable categories, the EPO will ask if the 
                                                
343 Obiter of Lord Hoffmann in Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1997] RPC 1, at 41-42. 
344 Justine Pila, ‘On the European Requirement for an Invention’ (2010) 41(8) IIC 906. 
345 Ibid, p.913. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid, p.914. 
 68 
application has ‘technical character’.348 Even if a subject matter has a single technical feature, 
which is not necessarily a dominant technical feature, then that subject matter will be deemed 
as an invention for the purposes of the EPC.349 However, having ‘a technical character’ does 
not imply that the invention is making ‘a technical contribution’. It is important to note here 
that, making a ‘technical contribution’ is not evaluated at this stage. As discussed in the TBA 
decision in Vicom/Computer-Related Invention350, the invention’s technical contribution will be 
evaluated when assessing novelty and inventive step. 
 
The TBA summarises the principles governing the requirement of an invention in its decision 
in Duns Licensing Associated/Estimating sales activity351, which is later affirmed by the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal (henceforth EBA) in the decision President’s Reference/Computer program 
exclusion352:  
 
“[Having] technical character is an implicit requisite of an “invention” within the 
meaning of Art.52(1) EPC (requirement of “technicality”). Article 52(2) EPC does 
not exclude from patentability any subject matter or activity having technical 
character, even if it is related to the items listed in this provision since these items 
are only excluded “as such” (Art.52(3) EPC). [The] four requirements invention, 
novelty, inventive step, and susceptibility of industrial application are essentially 
separate and independent criteria of patentability, which may give rise to 
concurrent objections.  [For] examining patentability of an invention in respect of 
a claim, the claim must be construed to determine the technical features of the 
invention, i.e. the features which contribute to the technical character of the 
invention. It is legitimate to have a mix of technical and “non-technical” features 
appearing in a claim, in which the non-technical features may even form a 
dominating part of the claimed subject matter. Novelty and inventive step, 
however, can be based only on technical features, which thus have to be clearly 
defined in the claim. Non-technical features, to the extent that they do not 
interact with the technical subject matter of the claim for solving a technical 
problem, i.e. non-technical features “as such”, do not provide a technical 
                                                
348 Pila (n.279), p.173. 
349 Ibid. 
350 T208/84 [1987] EPOR 74 at 80-81. 
351 T154/04 [2007] EPOR 38. 
352 G3/09 [2009] EPOR 9. 
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contribution to the prior art and are thus ignored in assessing novelty and 
inventive step.”353 
 
However, what the EPO means by the concept of ‘technical’ is only recently been explained 
by the EPC in the EBA decision in Essentially Biological Processes354: 
 
“Human intervention, to bring about a result by utilising the forces of nature, pertains to the 
core of what an invention is understood to be. Like national laws, the EPC does 
not define the term “invention”, but the definition that was given many years ago 
in the “Red Dove” (Rote Taube) decision of the German Federal Court of Justice 
[…] set a standard which still holds good today and can be said to be in 
conformity with the concept of “invention” within the meaning of the EPC.  
In that decision, in the version of the translation into English published in 1 IIC 
(1970), 136, the German Federal Court of Justice defined the term “invention” as 
requiring a technical teaching. The term technical teaching was characterised as “a teaching to 
methodically utilize controllable natural forces to achieve a causal, perceivable result.” […] 
The term “technology” (in German “Technik”), which is now enshrined in 
art.52(1) EPC but which at all material times underlay the understanding of the 
term “invention”, was deliberately not defined by the legislator in order not to 
preclude that adequate protection would be available for the results of 
developments in the future in fields of research which the legislator could not 
foresee. […] 
Ever since then, biological forces and phenomena, to the extent that they are controllable, have 




Gene patents: discovery as such vs. invention?  
 
So, when exactly does a scientific knowledge, an unpatentable discovery of a gene turn into a 
patentable technical invention? How does the patent law deal with this elusive 
                                                
353 T154/04 [2007] EPOR 38 at 361. 
354 G2/07 and G1/08 [2011] EPOR 27. 
355 Ibid at [128]-[131]. 
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transformation? Especially after the mapping of the human genome, providing an answer to 
these questions became essential for the sustainability of the existing patent law rules and 
concepts.356 The scientist who made the discovery will enjoy the fame, honours, and prizes. 
The industrialist, on the other hand, will enjoy the patent protection for the subsequent 
practical, i.e. ‘industrial’ applications of a discovery.357 Cornish and others explore some 
possible explanations for this dynamic, while noting that the reasons referred to remain 
unsatisfactory:358 A broad interpretation of an invention will commodify knowledge and will 
prevent free exchange of knowledge which is essential for the advance of technology359; basic 
knowledge may have multiple applications360; rewarding the first scientist who made the first 
discovery will confer him an unjust market lead with regards to the other applications waiting 
to be discovered361.  
 
Under Article 52 of the EPC, “discovery as such” is not a patentable invention. Gene patents 
were chiefly disputed under this article because it has been debated that whether an isolated 
gene would have technical character for the mere fact that it had been identified or 
identification is not enough to give the invention technical character because it still exists in 
nature as such, i.e. it is still a discovery. The TBA addressed these issues in the case of Howard 
Florey362.  
 
The claimed invention concerned a recombinant DNA sequence encoding for H2-Relaxin. 
H2-Relaxin is a naturally occurring hormone in the ovaries that is synthesized in order to 
relax the uterus during childbirth. Under Article 52(2)(a), the OD rejected the patent 
application on the grounds that it was an unpatentable discovery. However, upon appeal to 
the TBA, it was held that mere isolation of the gene, a substance naturally occurring in 
nature, would confer the invention enough technical character to deem it a patentable 
invention rather than an unpatentable discovery.363 On remand, the OD supported the TBA 
on the “the patentability of natural substances” 364 that:  
 
                                                






362 [1995] EPOR 541. 
363 Aplin (n.242), p.603. 
364 [1995] EPOR 541, at 548. 
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“[A] substance freely occurring in nature is mere discovery and therefore 
unpatentable. However, if a substance found in nature has first to be isolated from 
its surroundings and a process for obtaining it is developed, that process is 
patentable. Moreover, if this substance can be properly characterized by its structure and it is 
new in the absolute sense of having no previously recognized existence, then the substance per se 
may be patentable. […]Human H2-relaxin had no previously recognized existence. The 
proprietor has developed a process for obtaining H2-relaxin and the DNA 
encoding it, has characterized these products by their chemical structure and has 
found a use for the protein. The products are therefore patentable under Article 
52(2) EPC.”365 [emphasis added]  
 
This decision demonstrated the practice of the EPO in applying the test of technical character 
to the genetic sequence patents. Isolation of a naturally occurring substance that has no 
previously recognized existence will provide the invention enough technical character to 
deem it sufficient to pass the primary patentability test of requirement of an invention, 
because it is no longer a discovery as such. But as set forth by the decision in Howard Florey, 
there are also policy considerations for deeming isolated genes patentable because the person 
who first made the gene available to the public deserves a proprietary protection over the 
gene.366 This decision and test has been reflected in the Biotech Directive Article 3(2)367 and 
Article 5368.  
 
The discussion of where exactly genetic material falls in the context of the discovery versus 
invention debate seems to be resolved with the enactment of the Biotech Directive because 
Article 5(2) explicitly allows genetic sequences to be patentable subject matter. According to 
Article 5(2), an identification of the gene is a discovery until that gene is isolated from the 
body and transferred to an external environment.369 However, it is interesting to note that 
whether the SCOTUS decision of Myriad (US) will change the attitude in Europe towards 
patentability of genetic sequences remains to be seen. 
                                                
365 Ibid. 
366 Pila (n.279), p.175. 
367 Article 3(2) stipulates: “Biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by 
means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously occurred in nature.” 
368 Article 5 stipulates: “(1) The human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and the 
simply discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene cannot constitute 
patentable inventions. (2) An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a 
technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, 
even if that element is identical to that of a natural element.” 
369 Stazi (n.65), p.210. 
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Furthermore, via the Article 3(1) the Biotech Directive resolved the debate by stating “the 
human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and the simple discovery 
of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute 
patentable inventions.” So, the involvement of a laboratory process when isolating the gene 
and producing the cDNA, which does not have to be inventive in itself, render it an 
invention.370 The Biotech Directive uses an overarching concept of “industrial applicability” 
while distinguishing this elusive gap between a discovery and an invention with regards to 
genetic inventions. When the difference is not obvious, what the Biotech Directive requires, 
which is also endorsed by the EPO, is to find “a immediate concrete benefit”371 of the 
invention.372 This overarching requirement of industrial applicability under the Biotech 
Directive, which addresses the problems raised by the lack of clear definitions under the EPC 
will be explored more in depth in the later sections. For now, let’s move on to the EPC’s 
treatment of the genetic inventions with regards to the morality exception. 
 
b. The Morality and ‘Ordre Public’ Exceptions 
 
The drafters of the EPC intended the concept of ‘ordre public’ to have a common European 
interpretation rather than having several varying national interpretations.373 For example, as 
stated by the TBA, in the case of Plant Genetic Systems/Glutamine synthetase inhibitors374 “the 
culture in question is the culture inherent in European society and civilisation.”375 Other than 
this, the drafters of the EPC provided for no further instruction on how to interpret the 
concepts of ‘ordre public’ and morality, and have not set forth clear margins on the meanings of 
these concepts.376 This work was left to the boards of the EPO and national courts. Over the 
years, the EPO developed three different assessments of the morality exception.  
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374 T356/93 [1995] EPOR 357. 
375 Ibid, at 366 
376 Mills (n.218), p.53.   
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Assessing morality I: a balancing exercise of costs and benefits of the invention 
 
The first time the EPO considered the extent of the morality exception was the utilitarian test 
conducted by the TBA in the case of Harvard/Onco-mouse377 (henceforth the Onco-mouse case) in 
1990. This first test set forth by the EPO weighed the risks of the invention against the 
benefits of the invention to the public.378 The Onco-mouse patent filed on June 1985 claimed a 
method for producing a transgenic379 non-human mammal with increased susceptibility to 
developing cancer, and also claimed the animal itself. The Examining Division to the EPO 
(henceforth ED) at first did not refuse the application under the Article 53(a)380, and declared 
that the morality exception was irrelevant and patent law was not the appropriate tool for 
conducting a moral assessment of a patent application.381,382 However upon appeal, the TBA 
directed the ED to apply the morality exclusion: “The decision as to whether or not Article 
53(a) EPC is a bar to patenting the present invention would seem to depend mainly on a 
careful weighing up of the suffering of animals and possible risks to the environment on the 
one hand, and the invention’s usefulness to mankind on the other.”383 This time, when the 
ED reevaluated the application, in the light of the TBA’s guidance on the morality exception, 
the patent was granted as the benefits of the invention outweighed the risks associated with 
it.384 According to the ED, “the invention’s usefulness to mankind cannot be denied. Cancer 
is one of the most frequent causes of death. Any contribution to the development of new and 
improved human anti-cancer treatment is therefore a benefit to mankind.”385 Moreover, “the 
use of the animals [gives] rise to a smaller number of animals being required when compared 
to the number of animals needed in corresponding conventional testing”386 and the invention 
                                                
377 T19/90 [1990] EPOR 501. 
378 Pila (n.279), p.159. 
379 ‘Transgenic’ describes “an organism harbouring in its germ line a gene that has been introduced using cDNA 
technology[…]”. ‘Transgenic’ in Cammack (n.13). 
380 The ED refused the application under the Article 53(b) animal variety exception, and argued that that 
exception should not be interpreted as restrictively as the plant variety exception because the plant variety 
exception exists in order to avoid double protection of plants under patent law and the sui generis plant breeder’s 
right established in the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1961. For more 
on this issue, see the following EPO decisions: Harvard/Onco-mouse T19/90 [1990] EPOR 501; Plant Genetic 
Systems/Glutamine synthetase inhibitors T356/93 [1995] EPOR 357; Novartis/Transgenic plant G01/98 [2000] EPOR 
303.  
381 [1990] EPOR 4, para.10.3.  
382 Aplin (n.242), p.616.  
383 Harvard/Onco-mouse T19/90 [1990] EPOR 501, at 513. 
384 Harvard/Onco-mouse [1991] EPOR 525.  
385 Ibid, at 527. 
386 Ibid. 
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would not pose any “possible risks to the environment [because the invention is] to be used 
exclusively in the laboratory under controlled conditions by qualified staff.”387  
 
This case paved the way for the first time a moral analysis of the patent applications. 
Beyleveld and Brownsword discuss different approaches to the relationship between the 
Article 53(a) morality exception and the general patentability rules.388 They distinguish 
between three different approaches: (1) The facilitative approach; (2) the restrictive approach; 
and (3) a rational approach. Under the facilitative approach they argue that if “the Europe 
were issue a moral veto to applications, it will be deprived of the benefits of new 
technologies”389 and moreover over-regulation would leave Europe behind its competitors 
U.S. and Japan.390 Thus, the pro-patent lobby advocates flexibility of patent law vis-à-vis new 
technologies and calls for leaving any sort of moral veto outside the scope and predictability 
of patent law.391 Under the restrictive approach, because the morality exception is part of the 
EPC392, Article 53(a) requires an assessment of “the moral conception of patentability” rather 
than “a purely technical conception” of a patent.393 Lastly, as favoured by the authors, a 
rational approach would prefer an assessment of each patent application on its own merits so 
the assessment would neither automatically exclude an application claiming a 
biotechnological product nor automatically grant a patent because of the large sums of 
investment made in the research.394 Beyleveld and Brownsword also note that a purely 
utilitarian approach to morality would still create problems because of two reasons: (1) A cost-
benefit analysis is based on assumed weights assigned to both sides of the arguments; and (2) 
such an approach does not necessarily recognize centrality of human rights395, which is 
central to an assessment of a European ‘ordre public’ and morality.396 
 
                                                
387 Ibid, at 528. 
388 Beyleveld (n.312). 
389 Ibid, p.25.  
390 For example, under the U.S. patent law, morality of the invention is not assessed and regulated by the patent 
office before the grant. 
391 Beyleveld (n.312), p.25. 
392 Ibid, p.38. 
393 Ibid, pp.28,46. 
394 Ibid, p.26. 
395 Ibid, pp.57,70. 
396 Ibid, p.118. 
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Assessing morality II: alternative approach 
 
In the later EPO case of Plant Genetic Systems/Glutamine synthetase inhibitors397 in 1995, the TBA 
opted to rely on definition of concepts rather than conducting a cost-benefit analysis test 
adopted previously in the Onco-mouse case. Accordingly, the TBA has defined ‘ordre public’ as 
“the protection of public security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of society 
[…] encompassing also the protection of the environment […] and inventions the 
exploitation of which is likely to breach public peace or social order or seriously to prejudice 
the environment.”398 Moreover, the TBA defined the concept of morality as “related to the 
belief that some behaviour is right and acceptable whereas other behaviour wrong, this belief 
being founded on the totality of the accepted norms which are deeply rooted in […] the 
culture inherent in European society and civilisation.”399 According to this alternative 
approach of the TBA, the test is whether the invention deploys a subject matter conceived by 
the European cultural standards as outrageous and abhorrent.400,401 The TBA also stated that 
the morality exclusion to patentability should be interpreted restrictively in order to serve the 
intention of the drafters of the EPC, which is to maximize the scope of patentability, thus to 
maximize the number of patent grants which is thought to benefit the economic policy.402 It is 
important to note here that these cases and the two different tests employed in assessing the 
invention in relation to Article 53(a) demonstrate that Article 53(a) might have not been 
helpful in determining restrictions on patentability on moral grounds as it has failed to 
establish legal certainty.403 
 
Assessing morality III: inventions involving human biological material 
 
It is important to note here two further points for a more complete overview of the morality 
exception. First point to note is that the discussion of the morality requirement also involves a 
discussion of donor consent when the invention concerns human biological material; 
however, as this subject provokes a separate debate on its own, the issue of consent will not be 
                                                
397 T356/93 [1995] EPOR 357. 
398 Ibid, at 366-7. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Pila (n.279), p.159. 
401 This test was first set forth in the earlier case of Howard Florey, which will be discussed in the next section. 
402 Pila (n.279), p.163. 
403 Mills (n.218), p.74.   
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discussed for the purposes of this paper.404 The second point to note is that the morality 
requirement has also been incorporated into Article 6 of the Biotech Directive, which states 
that “inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would 
be contrary to ordre public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so 
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation.” Accordingly, the ECJ also 
proposed its own test of dignity in the Brüstle case405 in 2011, which to a certain extent 
confirmed the test adopted by the EBA in the case of WARF/Thomsen stem cell application406 in 
2009. The test set forth by the ECJ is whether the commercialisation, i.e. patenting, of human 
biological material would offend fundamental rights of human dignity and human 
integrity.407 This view is also consistent with a combined reading of Recitals 39 and 43 of the 
Biotech Directive stating “ethical or moral principles supplement[ing] the standard legal 
examinations under patent law”408 should “respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.”409,410 This test may refute any instrumentalist justification as it creates a rights-
based411 examination for the patent application and would categorically deny any 
instrumentalist treatment of the human body.412 On the other hand, an instrumentalist 
justification may also integrate such an analysis as the protection of human rights, dignity and 
integrity may be considered to be a moral benefit to the society.  
 
Concerning gene patents, the discussion of the morality assessment concerning human 
biological material made in the above paragraph raises the following question:  would patents 
granted for isolated genes violate any fundamental rights as well? Unfortunately, as this issue 
                                                
404 For more information of the issue see the relevant cases of Howard Florey/Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541; 
Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European Union C-377/98 [2001] ECR I-7079; Breast and ovarian 
cancer/University of Utah (T1213/05) of 27.9.2007 (Technical Board of Appeal); and the U.S. Supreme Court of 
California case Moore v Regents of the University of California 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990). Additionally, note that according 
to the Recital 26 of the Biotech Directive “if an invention is based on biological material of human origin or if it 
uses such material, the person from whose body the material is taken must have had an opportunity of 
expressing free and informed consent” for that invention to be deemed patentable. This is also consistent with 
the international principles of medical and research ethics such as Articles 6 and 7 of the UNESCO Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights 2005. Pila (n.279), p.159. 
405 C-34/10 [2012] CMLR 41.   
406 G2/06 [2009] EPOR 15. 
407 Pila (n.279), p.159. 
408 Biotech Directive, Recital 39. 
409 Biotech Directive, Recital 43. 
410 See Mills (n.218), pp.130-134.    
411 See Beyleveld and Brownsword (n.309); and also see Brownsword’s conceptualisation of a “bioethical 
triangle” consisting of utilitarian, human rights and dignitarian perspectives as the main conflicting views in the 
morality debate concerning the regulation of biotechnology in Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the 
Technological Revolution (OUP, 2008), pp.35-41. 
412 Pila (n.279), p.161. 
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has not been addressed yet in a comprehensive manner by the ECJ or the EPO, and since the 
Brüstle test involved human embryos, which is an explicitly restricted subject-matter under 
Article 6(2) of the Biotech Directive, the answer to the question seems to be that there 
wouldn’t be a violation. Although it may seem irrelevant at first look, in the U.K. case of 
International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents413, again concerning patentability 
of human stem cells, it was held that “the capability of commencing the process of 
development of a human being”414 is not sufficient for the purposes of defining the human 
embryo, but “must necessarily have the inherent capacity of developing into a human 
being.”415,416 Although this decision concerns the definition of a human embryo, the 
relationship between the definition and the morality exclusion based on the human dignity 
test may illustrate how the Court may apply the same test to the gene patents; but as the 
genes by themselves do not have the inherent capacity to evolve into a human being, it is 
unlikely that human gene patents would fail the human dignity test applied in a similar 
way.417,418  
 
Assessing morality of gene patents 
 
Finally, before we conclude this section, lets take a look at how the EPO assessed morality in 
the case of Howard Florey419. Among other claims420, the patent was opposed chiefly because 
DNA represents ‘life’ and thus patenting ‘life’ would have been immoral.421 Against this 
argument, the OD held that: 
 
“[…] the allegation that human life is being patented is unfounded. It is worth 
pointing out that DNA is not 'life', but a chemical substance which carries genetic information 
and can be used as an intermediate in the production of proteins which may be 
medically useful. The patenting of a single human gene has nothing to do with the 
patenting of human life. Even if every gene in the human genome were cloned 
                                                
413 [2013] EWHC 807 
414 Ibid at [27]. 
415 Ibid at [28]. 
416 Pila (n.279), p.161. 
417 See the discussion in the following sub-section. 
418 Mills (n.218), p.135.   
419 [1995] EPOR 541. 
420 For example, another important claim was that the patent application involved abuse of pregnant women 
and the issue of donor consent. Ibid, at 549. 
421 Pila (n.279), p.162. 
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(and possibly patented), it would be impossible to reconstitute a human being from the sum of 
its genes.”422, 423 [emphasis added] 
 
The OD also stated the importance of human proteins for medical purposes424, which 
illustrates the instrumentalist accounts for patentability of genetic inventions. And lastly, the 
OD provided a test for the general rule on the morality exception asking if “the invention is 
so abhorrent that the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable.”425 The OD recognized 
that “the EPO is not the right institution to decide on fundamental ethical questions”426 and 
stated that “[as] for the opponents' general assertions concerning the alleged intrinsic 
immorality of patenting human genes, these are founded on the premise that there is an 
overwhelming consensus among the Contracting States that the patenting of human genes is 
abhorrent and hence prohibited under Article 53(a). This assumption is false.”427 It is also 
important to note here that following the Biotech Directive, which explicitly states, “the 
sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the 
structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element”428 this approach regarding 
the patentability of genes most likely is still good law today. Article 5(2) of the Biotech 
Directive429 is later reaffirmed by the TBA decision of T272/95 Relaxin/Howard Florey Institute 
of 23 October 2002. 
Next, we will discuss the problems in the secondary requirements of novelty, inventive step 
and industrial applicability of gene patents, which will prove to be problematic enough for 
patent law without the additional problem of the moral assessment of the genetic 
inventions.430 
                                                
422 [1995] EPOR 541, at 551. 
423 This may suggest that even under the human dignity test of Brüstle, the gene patents would not deemed 
violating any human right, dignity and integrity.  
424 [1995] EPOR 541, at 551. 
425 Ibid, at 550. 
426 Ibid, at 552. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Biotech Directive, Article 5(2).  
429 Which is added as the Implementing Rule 23(d) to the EPC. 
430 Mills (n.218), p.105.   
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Patents are granted only if the claimed invention is new. According to EPC Article 54, “an 
invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art.” The 
reasoning behind this requirement is to ensure that the patent is not going to prevent the 
public from doing what they have been doing before the grant of the patent, and also to 
justify the grant of the patent by ensuring that the proprietary right is conferred in exchange 
for new technical information made available to the public.431 However, in order to defeat 
novelty, mere existence of prior information is not enough, the state of the art432 must enable 
the person skilled in the art433 to anticipate the invention.434 
 
Concerning genetic sequences, the identification and isolation of the gene from its outside 
environment will make it novel.435 This is the same principle applied to the novelty of 
chemical substances occurring in nature. According to this principle, even if a substance 
occurs naturally, when it is produced in a purer form, patent law can treat that substance as 
novel given that there are structural differences between the purer form and the natural 
form.436 With regards to genetic sequences, this principle applies even if the purer, i.e. 
isolated, gene sequence is structurally identical to its naturally occurring form. This 
divergence is explained by deriving novelty from the fact that the isolated gene, even if 
structurally identical to the naturally occurring molecule, makes the molecule available to the 
public for the first time. Accordingly in the TBA’s decision in Pyridine herbicides/ICI437, “a 
compound defined by its chemical structure can only be regarded as being disclosed in a 
particular document if it has been 'made available to the public' in the sense of Article 54(2) 
EPC.”438 Moreover, the fact that a DNA library439 contains the claimed DNA sequence 
would not defeat novelty because it has not yet been made available to the public.440,441  
                                                
431 Aplin (n.242), p.647. 
432 For a detailed discussion of the concept of the ‘state of the art’ see ibid, pp.647-651. 
433 The attributes of this hypothetical person skilled in the art are recounted in the U.K. Patents Court case of 
Pfizer Ltd’s Patent [2001] FSR 16 at [62]-[64]. 
434 Dianne Nicol, ‘On the Legality of Gene Patents’, (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 809, p.822. 
435 Ibid, p.831. 
436 Bostyn (n.332), p.7. 
437 T0206/83 [1986] EPOR 32. 
438 Ibid at 236. 
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Lord Hoffmann in the U.K. House of Lords decision of Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoecht Marion Roussel 
Ltd442 criticizes this practice of the EPO: 
 
“The only case in which the EPO will accept a claim to a product defined in 
terms of its process of manufacture is when the product is new in the sense of 
being different from any existing product in the state of the art but the difference 
cannot be described in chemical or physical terms.443 […] the requirement is that 
the product must be new and that a difference in the method of manufacturing an 
identical product does not make it new. It is only if the product is different but the 
difference cannot in practice be satisfactorily defined by reference to its 
composition, that a definition by process of manufacture is allowed. The latter 
may be a rule of practice but the proposition that an identical product made by a 
new process does not count as new is in my opinion a proposition of law. It cannot 
be new in law but not new for the purposes of the practice of the Office.”444 
 
b. Inventive Step 
 
Article 56 of the EPC provides that “an invention shall be considered as involving an 
inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in 
the art.” While novelty assesses the state of the art quantitatively, inventive step analyses it 
qualitatively.445 The inventive step requirement ensures that the patents are granted only to 
inventions worthy of proprietary protection as opposed to inventions built on obvious 
adjustments of the state of the art.446 It also strikes a balance between the costs associated with 
restricting competition by assigning a monopoly to the patent holder and the benefits 
                                                                                                                                                  
439 A DNA library is “a collection of cloned DNA fragments representing the entire genetic material of an 
organism. (i.e. a genomic library) or just the genes transcribed in particular cells or tissues at a given time (i.e. a 
complementary DNA library, or cDNA library)…” ‘DNA library’ in Hine (n.133). 
440 Bostyn (n.332), p.18. 
441 See the TBA’s decision in Biogen/Recombinant DNA T301/87 [1990] EPOR 190 at [5.1]-[5.3]. 
442 [2005] RPC 9.  
443 Ibid at 198. 
444 Ibid at 199-200. 
445 Aplin (n.242), p.685. 
446 Ibid. 
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associated with the quid pro quo of the patent system.447 Thus, setting a right threshold for the 
test assessing the inventiveness of the invention is crucial for any patent system.448  
 
The traditional test employed by the EPO is ‘the problem-solution approach test’449, which 
first establishes the closest state of the art and the technical effect achieved by that state of the 
art (‘the problem’), and then determines whether the technical effect of the claimed invention 
(‘solution’) was obvious450 in addressing that problem.451 With regard to gene sequences, the 
EPO in the case of Howard Florey first employed a very broad test in assessing inventiveness, 
and held that the novelty of the genetic sequence was sufficient to demonstrate its 
inventiveness.452 However, this approach is no longer valid. 
 
The current test asks “whether the technique used to obtain the sequence information is 
‘obvious’ to try.”453 An early guidance for this interpretation of inventiveness with regard to 
gene sequences can be seen in the U.K. Court of Appeal of England and Wales case of 
Genentech Inc.’s Patent454. There it was held that there was no inventive step in the discovery of 
the sequences because Genentech relied on the application of the known recombinant 
technology without any original step.455 In the context of the advent of a new and complex 
technology, it makes sense that every claim for an invention will seem dramatically new and 
inventive.456 However, in order for the patent system to promote and foster such complex 
technologies like genetic testing, the patent system must continue to treat the standard test of 
inventive step as meticulously as possible.457 It is important to note that the current 
technology used in DNA sequencing and isolation of a gene has become routine and heavily 
reliant on the computer power, which may question the inventiveness of the inventions 
concerning genetic sequences.458  
 
                                                
447 Hazel V.J. Moir, ‘An inventive step for the patent system?’ (2013) 35 EIPR 125, p.125.  
448 Ibid, pp.125-128. 
449 See the EPO, Guidelines (n.330), Part G, Chapter VII-2, at 5, section titled “Problem-and-solution-approach”.  
450 According to the EPO Guidelines, “the term "obvious" means that which does not go beyond the normal 
progress of technology but merely follows plainly or logically from the prior art, i.e. something which does not 
involve the exercise of any skill or ability beyond that to be expected of the person skilled in the art.” Ibid, Part 
G, Chapter VII-2, at 4, section titled “Obviousness”. 
451 Bostyn (n.332), p.19. 
452 Pila (n.279), p.192. 
453 Nicol (n.434), p.832. 
454 [1989] RPC 147. 
455 Ibid at 155. 
456 Cornish (n.213), p.908. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Discussion Paper on the Ethics of Patenting DNA (July 2012), p.29. 
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The EPO assesses the inventiveness of a gene patent not with regards to whether the 
sequence itself was obvious or not, but rather with regards to whether it is obvious to the 
person skilled in the art. The EPO states that: “Prima facie, the routine provision of further 
sequences having the same general function as the known prior art sequences of closely 
related structure is not inventive. The structural non-obviousness is not a reason to accept an 
inventive step; sequences as well as all other chemical compounds should solve a technical 
problem in a non-obvious manner to be recognized as inventive.”459 Accordingly, the current 
technology460 relying on the computer power in order to identify the gene sequences is 
unlikely to pass the inventive step of the EPO.461  
 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics compares the low threshold of the U.S. ‘non-obviousness’ 
requirement with the firmer approach the EPO uses in its ‘inventive step’ test, suggesting that 
the test of the EPO as more appropriate.462 It can also be argued that the higher threshold 
used in Europe may harm the European biotech industry in the long term.463 However, it is 
interesting to note that the current legal landscape is in the favour of the European biotech 
industry after the SCOTUS decision in Myriad (US). 
 
c. Industrial Application 
 
Article 57 of the EPC stipulates “an invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial 
application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.” 
According to the EPO Guidelines, “‘industry’ should be understood in its broad sense as 
including any physical activity of ‘technical character’; […] Article 57 excludes from 
patentability very few ‘inventions’, which are not already excluded by the list in Article 
52(2).”464 It should be noted that, having industrial applicability is not a prerequisite 
overriding the test of technical character under Article 52(2).465 Two tests are patentability 
criteria that must be satisfied independently from one another. An invention having industrial 
application may not have technical character, and lack of technical character may not be 
                                                
459 EPO, Japan Patent Office and USTPO, Trilateral Project B3b, Comparative study on biotechnology patent practices – 
Theme: Patentability of DNA fragments (November 2001). 
460 Referred to as in silico approach, which means being performed on a computer or via a computer simulation 
(with reference to in vivo and in vitro methods used in biology and biomedicine). 
461 Nuffield Council (n.458), p.30. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Cornish (n.213), p.909. 
464 EPO, Guidelines (n.330), Part G, Chapter III-1, at 1, section titled ‘General Remarks’. 
465 Bostyn (n.332), p.21. 
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objected under industrial applicability.466 The test of industrial applicability is for 
demonstration of some commercial value. If the claimed invention cannot be used in an 
industry, it would not have any commercial value, and thus it would not generate any public 
benefit in the long term.467 Under the instrumentalist account of a patent, this will render the 
invention not worthy of a proprietary protection because the inventor does not hold his end 
of the bargain. Until biotechnological patenting, this requirement was not a problematic issue 
in patent law.  
 
The problem with the industrial applicability of genetic sequences is that the specific 
functions of a discovered DNA sequence are not always simultaneously discovered at the time 
of identification of the genetic data. It often takes more investment and research to uncover 
specific functions of the gene, so patent protection is often sought upon identification of the 
gene, before accruing the additional financial risk.468 Correspondingly, this situation causes 
problems concerning the interpretation of the test of industrial applicability. Is disclosing one 
potential function enough to satisfy the industrial applicability requirement?469 The answer to 
this question was in the affirmative since the grant of the first gene patents because as Article 
57 prescribes, the claimed invention only needs to be susceptible of industrial application, 
which suggests that the invention should have the potential to be used in the market and 
generate commercial value.470 As this was the case, especially after the completion of the 
Human Genome Project, many gene patent applications were filed without demonstrating a 
sufficient and specific function, i.e. industrial applicability, of the sequence. The patentee only 
had to demonstrate the commercial capability of the invention, including its use for further 
research.471 The issue of granting patents for such claims without specific function has since 
been controversial.472 As a response to this problem, Margaret Llewellyn has suggested “a 
possible interim patent” that is granted for a limited time in order for the patent-holder to 
have more ‘protected’ time to demonstrate more specific commercial uses of the genetic 
sequence.473 However, courts have opted to interpret the industrial applicability requirement 
                                                
466 Ibid. 
467 Stazi (n.65), p.25. 
468 Margaret Llewellyn, ‘Industrial Applicability/Utility and Genetic Engineering: Current Practices in Europe 
and the United States’ [1994] EIPR 473, p.474. 
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more restrictively in order to deal with the problems associated with its broader 
interpretation. 
 
For example, in the U.K. Court of Appeal for England and Wales case of Chiron Corporation v 
Murex Diagnostics Ltd474, the patent claims on the polypeptides were held to be invalid because 
of lack of industrial application475: “[…] the invention can be made or used ‘in any kind of 
industry’ so as to be ‘capable’ of ‘susceptible of industrial application’. The connotation is that 
of trade or manufacture in its widest sense and whether or not for profit. But for industry does 
not exist in that sense to make or use that which is useless for any known purpose.”476 
Trailing the USTPO Utility Examination Guidelines of 2001477, the OD of the EPO adopted 
a narrower interpretation of the industrial application requirement478 and held that “DNA 
sequences with indications of function which are not substantial, specific and credible shall 
not be patentable inventions.”479 The European Commission too affirmed the OD’s 
restrictive approach to the industrial applicability and stated that “the potential utilisation of a 
sequence disclosed in an application must not be speculative, i.e. it must be specific, 
substantial and credible.”480 And lastly, the Biotech Directive employs a similar approach as 
well, which will be discussed at length in the following section on the Biotech Directive.  
 
iv) Tertiary Patentability Requirement: Sufficiency of the Disclosure 
 
The scope of the patent protection is determined by the scope of the claims disclosed in the 
patent. Setting the third patentability requirement, Article 83 of the EPC stipulates: “The 
European patent application shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and 
complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.” In biotechnology patenting, 
                                                
474 [1996] RPC 535. 
475 Aplin (n.242), p.628. 
476 [1996] RPC 535, at 607. 
477 Developments concerning the ‘utility’ criterion in the U.S. are discussed above in the section on U.S. patent 
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478 Icos Corporation/Seven transmembrane receptor [2002] OJ EPO 293 (Opposition Division).  
479 Ibid at [11(ii)]. 
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Development and implications of patent law in the field of biotechnology and genetic engineering’ 
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lack of sufficiency has posed problems of granting excessively wide protection 
disproportionate to the disclosed claims. However, after the enactment of the Biotech 
Directive, with regards to gene patenting, this requirement has been dealt under Article 9 
which provides that “the protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or 
consisting of genetic information shall extend to all material […] in which the genetic 
information is contained and performs its function” and Article 5(3) which states “the 
industrial application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the 
patent application.” The extent of these Articles will be discussed at length in the following 
section on the Biotech Directive. 
V. Substantive European Patent Law II: The Biotech Directive 
 
The objective of the Biotech Directive is to harmonise patent protection of biotechnological 
inventions “in order to maintain and encourage investment in the field of biotechnology”.481 The 
European Commission first proposed a harmonisation directive in 1988, but the European 
Parliament vetoed the proposed directive in 1995 as a result of opposition based on the claim 
that the ethical questions concerning the patenting of biotechnological inventions were 
inadequately addressed.482 Revising the proposal in the light of these objections, the 
Commission introduced a revised version in 1995, and finally in June1998 the European 
Council of Ministers adopted the Biotech Directive. However, a few months after adoption, 
Netherlands brought an action for annulment before the ECJ in October 1998. The grounds 
for annulment were mainly procedural.483 In October 2001, the ECJ rejected the claims of 
the opposition.484 Some of the Directive’s provisions are incorporated into the EPC as 
Implementing Regulations; specifically, the EPC adopted the Directive’s approach to 
industrial applicability regarding genetic inventions.485 Although technically the EPC is not 
obliged to follow the Directive, but Implementing Rule 26(1) to the EPC stipulates that 
“Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions 
shall be used as a supplementary means of interpretation.”  
                                                
481 Biotechnology Directive, Recital 3. 
482 D. Curley and A. Sharples, ‘Patenting Biotechnology in Europe: The Ethical Debate Moves On’ [2002] 24 
EIPR 565. 
483 A. Scott, ‘The Dutch Challenge to the Bio-Patenting Directive’ [1999] EIPR 212. 
484 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European Union Case C-377/98 [2001] ECR I-7079. 
485 Pozo (n.106), p.42.  
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According to Pila and Torremans, the impact of the Directive has been fourfold486: (1) It 
granted the ECJ jurisdiction over the substantive patentability criteria and rules.487 (2) It put 
pressure on the EPO to act in harmony with the decisions of the ECJ in order to avoid any 
conflict and loss of legitimacy.488 (3) It exposed the patent law to fundamental values of 
human rights, dignity and integrity.489,490 (4) It codified the previously uncodified requirement 
for an invention with regards to the patentability of isolated genetic sequences.491,492 
 
Some of the principles and rules on the substantive patent law after the Biotech Directive 
have already been dealt in the previous sections. The following subsection will instead 
significantly focus on the overarching principle of industrial applicability and how this 
resurrected requirement addresses some of the problems associated with gene patents.  
 
The Biotech Directive’s approach to industrial applicability: an overarching 
requirement of industrial applicability? 
 
The European Commission raised the threshold for the standard of industrial applicability 
and applied a stricter test for this requirement, thinking this to be the most appropriate 
response to the problems of granting gene patents for unspecific use.493 As a result, the usual 
principles governing the requirement of an industrial application have been extended.  
 
The effects of this move can immediately be observed in the assessment of the primary 
patentability requirement of being a patentable invention. As set forth by the Recital 23 of the 
Directive, “a mere DNA sequence without indication of a function does not contain any 
technical information and is therefore not a patentable invention.”  Therefore, in order to 
satisfy the technical character test distinguishing inventions from discoveries, a genetic 
sequence must have a function.494 Correspondingly, in Article 5(3) of the Directive, which is 
reproduced as the Implementing Rule 29(3) of the EPC, “the industrial application of a 
                                                




490 This has been discussed at length above, in section IV(ii)(b) “Assessing Morality III: Inventions Involving 
Human Biological Material”. 
491 Pila (n.279), p.177. 
492 This has been discussed at length above, in the section IV(ii)(a) “Gene Patents: Discovery as such vs. 
Invention?”.  
493 Pozo (n.106), p.77. 
494 Ibid, p.81. 
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sequence or a partial sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent application.” Before 
this new provision was introduced, the extent of industrial application did not give rise to any 
problems before the courts, and traditionally a broad interpretation of industrial applicability 
has been adopted by patent offices. Although how the Courts were going to deal with this 
new standard for the industrial applicability requirement was unclear, it appeared to be that 
Article 57 of the EPC and Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive was not compatible.495 In 
2000, a new interpretation for industrial applicability has been discussed in a Trilateral 
Project between Japanese, U.S., and European patent offices.496 They reached the conclusion 
that while a DNA sequence with no indicated specific function is not a patentable invention; a 
DNA sequence with disclosed specific function is a patentable invention.497  
 
This new standard raised a lot of questions. First, as established by the decision of the OD in 
the case of Icos Corporation/Seven transmembrane receptor498, in order to establish industrial 
applicability, it was no longer enough to disclose that the claimed genetic invention could be 
made and used, but ‘a substantial, credible and specific’ use had to be disclosed at the time of 
the application.499 This new approach is far from the formulation of ‘making available for the 
first time’ made in the case of Howard Florey. Icos Corporation/Seven transmembrane receptor 
rendered this broad interpretation of industrial applicability obsolete. Later in the TBA 
decisions in Multimeric Receptors/Salk Institute500 and BDP1 Phosphatase/Max Planck501, the EPO 
further distinguished mere research results from commercially exploitable genetic products. 
In both decisions the TBA emphasized the necessity to disclose a profitable use of the claimed 
invention.502 In the later TBA decision in Haematopoietic cytokine receptor/Zymogenetics503, the 
meaning of ‘profitable use’ has been defined as having ‘an immediate concrete benefit’504 –
the concrete benefit should be immediately obvious to the person skilled in the art, without 
requiring further research. 
 
“[…] the need to show a “profitable use” is not to be understood in the narrow 
sense of an actual or potential economic profit (i.e. generating more income than 
                                                
495 Ibid, p.87. 
496 EPO, Japan Patent Office and USTPO, Trilateral Project (n.459) at Annex 2 p.43. 
497 Pozo (n.106), pp.87-88. 
498 [2002] OJ EPO 293 (Opposition Division) 
499 Ibid. 
500 T338/00 [2002] (Technical Board of Appeal). 
501 T0807/04 [2005] (Technical Board of Appeal). 
502 Pozo (n.106), p.93. 
503 T0898 [2007] EPOR 2. 
504 Ibid.  
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expenditure) or of a commercial interest (i.e. creating a new or increased business 
opportunity). Rather, it must be understood in the wider sense that the invention 
claimed must have such a sound and concrete technical basis that the skilled 
person can recognise that its contribution to the art could lead to practical 
exploitation in industry. It would be at odds with the purpose of the patent system 
to grant exclusive rights to prevent the commercial activities of others on the basis 
of a purely theoretical or speculative patent application. This would amount to 
granting a monopoly over an unexplored technical field.”505 
 
Lastly, a more pro-industry approach506 to interpretation of industrial application has been 
adapted in the 2009 EPO507 and the 2011 UK Supreme Court (henceforth, UKSC)508 
decisions of Human Genome Sciences Inc. v Eli Lilly (henceforth the HGS (UK) case and the HGS 
(EPO) case)509 This dispute concerned the validity of a patent claiming a human genetic 
sequence. The invention had two noteworthy features510: (1) The gene was discovered by 
computer-assisted in silico techniques511; (2) the disclosed function of the protein encoded by 
the genetic sequence was based on the other similar proteins belonging to the same 
superfamily of proteins.512 
 
In HGS (EPO), the TBA upheld the patent with more restricted claims because it held that 
the application disclosed a concrete technical basis.  In HGS (UK), Lord Neuberger rejected 
the earlier argument of Lord Justice Jacob in the Court of Appeal decision holding the patent 
invalid due to lack of any indication of specific use. Although, the Court of Appeal has 
applied the same principle as the TBA, Lord Justice Jacob applied the test more stringently 
and reached a different conclusion.513 Lord Neuberger in the UKSC brought the standard of 
industrial applicability in the UK to the same level as the EPO. While the UKSC held that it 
was not enough to claim a sequence without a clear and specific practical use, it was noted 
                                                
505 Ibid, at [14]-[15]. 
506 Lord Neuberger notes “it would be wrong to set the hurdle for patentability too high”: Human Genome Sciences 
Inc. v Eli Lilly [2011] UKSC 51 [120]; and Lord Walker added on the policy goal to “reduce the risk of a chilling 
effect in investment in bioscience”; Ibid at [171]. Additionally, Lord Neuberger acknowledges the policy 
considerations for favouring a pro-biotech industry interpretation of the industrial applicability requirement. 
Ibid at [96]-[102]. 
507 Human Genome Sciences/Neutrokine, T18/09 (21 October 2009, EPO Technical Board of Appeal). 
508 [2011] UKSC 51. 
509 Bently (n.264), p.441.  
510 Ibid, p.442. 
511 Ibid. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Human Genome Sciences Inc v Eli Lilly & Co [2010] RPC 14. 
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that “an educated guess”514 would have been satisfactory to fulfil the industrial applicability 
requirement. The important question remains to be how to distinguish between ‘an 
acceptable educated guess’ and ‘purely speculative assumption’?515  The answer depends on 
the type of evidence the Court is willing to accept.516 In the HGS (UK), while the lower courts 
demanded empirical data proving the claimed use of the invention, the UKSC was satisfied 
with plausible prediction, following the standard set by the TBA in the HGS (EPO).517 
 
Timo Minssen and David Nilsson note that while it is evident from the decisions of the EPO 
that the current threshold for industrial applicability of a gene has been set higher, the HGS 
decisions bring more certainty to the regulatory framework of gene patenting.518 On the 
contrary, Andrew Sharples argues that the UKSC has set a lower standard for the industrial 
applicability test for wider policy considerations.519 He also suggests that the EPO too is far 
from setting a common standard for assessing the industrial applicability, and while the 
earlier cases insisted on an “immediate concrete benefit”, the HGS (EPO) ignored the 
“immediacy” and concluded only “a concrete benefit” would suffice, which is also supported 
by the HGS (UK).520  
 
And finally, the Biotech Directive uses the industrial applicability requirement in dealing with 
the problem of asymmetry between what is disclosed and what is protected. For example, it 
often occurred in practice that when a patent applicant claimed also the anticipated but 
unknown uses of the gene, the breadth of the protection would cover the anticipated but yet 
unknown commercial uses of the gene.521 The scope of a patent has always been an 
important issue not only for lawyers but also for economics.522 The breadth of the protection 
is important for the quid pro quo principle of patent law, and while a broad protection would 
facilitate the compensation of the costs of the inventor, a narrow protection would sustain 
                                                
514 Lord Neuberger provides for a 15-point summary of the EPO’s general approach to the principle of 
industrial applicability in Human Genome Sciences Inc. v Eli Lilly, [2011] UKSC 51 at [107]. At (viii) he states that 
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of Recent EPO & UK Law: A Plausible Approach or a Mere ‘Hunting License’?’ (2012) 23 EIPR 698, pp.701-
703. 
519 Andrew Sharples, ‘Industrial applicability, patents and the Supreme Court: Human Genome Sciences Inc v 
Eli Lilly and Co’ (2012) 34 EIPR 284. 
520 Ibid, p.286. 
521 Nicol (n.434), p.835. 
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competition even after the grant of the patent to the original invention.523 With the 
enactment of the Biotech Directive, currently the scope of gene patents is limited by way of 
Article 9 to “all material, […] in which the product in incorporated and in which the genetic 
information is contained and performs its function.”524 As gene patents are protected to the 
extend that they demonstrate industrial applicability under Article 5(3), these two articles 
together limit the scope of patent protection to the disclosed commercial uses of the genetic 
sequences.525 Hence, the protection available to the genetic sequences is now “purpose-
limited”.526 The ECJ confirmed this interpretation of Article 9 of the Directive in the case of 
Monsanto Technology LLC v Cefetra BV et al527. According to Pila and Torremans, this decision is 
important for the following two reasons528: (1) The scope of protection has been limited by 
reference to a patentability criterion529; (2) for the inventions concerning genetic sequences, 
the most important criterion of patentability is its claimed function, i.e. industrial 




Since the advent of new and complex technologies including biotechnology, there has been a 
lot of discussion regarding whether the existing patent law principles are able to 
accommodate inventions stemming from these technologies. Initial interaction between the 
substantive patentability requirements and the inventions concerning biological material, and 
more specifically genetic sequences, resulted in many problems as discussed in the above 
sections. A wide range of solutions have been suggested by many authors in the literature. For 
example, Marta Díaz Pozo helpfully lists various popular solutions dealing with these 
problems531: “(i) The creation of a sui generis gene right; (ii) imposing stricter compulsory 
licensing for specific gene patents; (iii) raising the threshold for current substantive 
patentability requirements; and (iv) avoiding genetic patenting as a whole.”532 With the 
enactment of the Biotech Directive, Europe seems to have opted for the third option of 
                                                
523 Ibid, p.24; also see Pozo (n.106), Chapter 6. 
524 Biotech Directive, Article 9. 
525 Pila (n.279), p.203. 
526 Ibid. 
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raising the threshold of the current substantive patentability requirement under the 
overarching principle of a higher standard of industrial applicability.533  
 
A stricter industrial applicability requirement safeguards the quid pro quo of the patent system 
so that patents are only granted for inventions providing real contributions to the society in 
the case of gene patents, and there is arguably less imbalance in the patent bargain.534 To a 
degree, this approach would also cooperate with the instrumentalist justification for patenting 
genetic sequences. A stricter industrial applicability requirement ensures patents are granted 
to patent-eligible and patent-worthy inventions, with protection proportionate to claims 
disclosed. The overarching industrial applicability requirement under the Biotech Directive 
offers a more balanced policy option addressing the issues concerning patentability of genetic 
sequences.535 Although this policy option does not provide an answer to every problem 
associated with gene patents, to large extent it prevents most of the negative effects of gene 
patents.536 Therefore, to sum up, it can be said that raising the threshold for current 
substantive patentability requirements is an efficient or at least more practical and feasible 
solution to the challenges gene patenting create.  
 
We will now move on to the last part of this paper. First we will examine very briefly some of 
the alternative options other than increasing the threshold of substantive patentability 
requirements for inventions concerning genetic sequences, and then we will conclude by 
discussing some of the new CRISPR technology that could rise to further complications in the 
relationship between patent law and genetic inventions. 
  
                                                
533 See ibid for a useful and more in-depth overview of this overarching industrial applicability requirement.  
534 Ibid, p.226. 
535 Ibid, p.229. 
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D. OTHER OPTIONS, CRISPR, AND CONCLUSION 
 
I. Alternative Options 
 
The previous part analysed how the Biotech Directive increased the threshold for industrial 
applicability for patents claiming genetic sequences for preventing over-patenting in human 
genetics. Raising the threshold for substantive patentability requirements is only one of the 
various popular solutions addressing the problem of over-patenting. Although the Biotech 
Directive’s approach to industrial applicability offers a balanced approach, as this new 
approach is not challenged enough before the ECJ, the limits of this solution is unclear the 
problems with gene patenting still is not completely resolved in the legal framework. Hence, 
before I conclude this paper, in order to offer a more complete overview of the issues, it is 
important to briefly introduce other solutions, namely widening the scope of experimental use 
exception and compulsory licensing, and a proposed sui generis gene right. However, it is 
important to note that, these topics are wide enough to develop into papers on their own. As 
they remain outside the main scope of this paper, which is the over-arching industrial 
applicability criterion under the Biotech Directive, it will be sufficient only to briefly 
introduce them. 
 
i) Experimental Use Exception  
 
In the justifications section, we have noted that under instrumentalist accounts for patenting, 
the quid pro quo principle is that the inventor discloses her invention to contribute to the 
common knowledge of the humankind, so nothing stays hidden and scientific and 
technological progress is facilitated. However, given the 20 year the proprietary protection, it 
creates a difficulty in experimentation by another scientist or inventor on the disclosed 
knowledge without infringing the patent.537 Cornish explains this tension as: “[…] if they [a 
person] may engage in such experiments as they please, the initial incentive of the patent may 
to a degree be diminished. But if they may not, the original patentee may control the further 
progress of a particular technology for the duration of his exclusive right.”538 For this purpose, 
an ‘experimental use’ exception was introduced in Article 27(b) of the Community Patent 
                                                
537 Aplin (n.242), pp.744-745. 
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Convention539 in 1989: “the rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts 
done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention.” It 
has been later adopted by national patent laws540 but so far the scope of this exception has not 
been harmonized. In the Advocate General opinion in the Netherlands v European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union case541, Advocate General Jacob states that “experimental use is 
one such exception: experiments aimed at perfecting, improving or further developing 
inventions do not infringe the patent.”542 Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommends that the 
scope of experimental use should be clarified in the U.S. and in Europe with regards to 
inventions concerning gene sequences.543 
ii) Compulsory Licensing 
 
The concept of compulsory licensing was introduced in Europe in the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property. Article 5(A)(2) sets forth compulsory licensing as “each 
country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant 
of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the 
exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.” In 1994, the concept 
was integrated as Article 31 to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (henceforth, TRIPS Agreement). Under the TRIPS Agreement, compulsory 
licensing is when the government authorise commercial use of a patent to a third party, who 
can use the patent without the explicit authorization of the patent holder.  
 
The scope of Article 31 has been discussed specifically with regards to pharmaceutical 
patents, as a reaction to the public health crisis in developing countries concerning high costs 
of pharmaceutical associated with patenting practice, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
                                                
539 Works on a European patent with unitary effect began in the 1970s. In 1975, the Luxembourg Conference 
on the Community Patent took place, and an intergovernmental treaty known as the Convention for the 
European Patent for the common market, or more commonly as the Community Patent Convention (CPC) was 
signed. Commission (EC) ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on a Community Patent’ COM (2000) 412 final 
OJ C337E, 28 November 2000.   It had the intention to create a single European Community patent, which 
would be obtained through a central procedure and would take effect on all Contracting Members. 
Nevertheless, the CPC was a failure because it was not ratified by enough countries and it never entered into 
force. Aplin (n.242), pp.555,558 
540 For example, the U.K. section 60(5)(b) of the Patent Act 1977; the U.K. patent law case of Monsanto Co v 
Stauffer Chemical Co [1985] RPC 515; the German Supreme Court case of Klinische Versuche I and II [1997] RPC 
623 and [1998] RPC 423; and for a comparison with the U.S. see Madey v Duke University 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) and also Rimmer (n.141), pp.164-186. 
541 C-377/98 [2001] ECR I-7079. 
542 Advocate General Jacob’s opinion in C-377/98 at [27] 
543 Nuffield Council (n.458), pp.71-73. 
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Agreement and Public Health was adopted by the Word Trade Organization Ministerial 
Conference of 2001. The Doha Declaration was celebrated as a major breakthrough, 
encouraging developing countries to effective use of compulsory licensing mechanism under 
the TRIPS Agreement in order to address their public health problems.544 According to 
Matthew Rimmer, use of compulsory licensing for gene patents in Europe would help with 
the excess costs associated genetic diagnostic tests set by patent holders,545 so that compulsory 
licensing in genetic diagnostic testing would offer a balance between the “private interests of 
the patent holder” and “public interests”. 546  
 
iii) Sui Generis Gene Right 
 
Some commentators argue that the patent system is fundamentally unsuited to be used for 
incentivizing investments in the biotechnology sector. The gist of this position is that the 
subject of genomic research and genetic engineering are natural phenomena and naturally 
occurring substances, which cannot and should not be considered as technical inventions, for 
which the patent system has been created.  
 
For instance, according to Luigi Palombi, the broadening of the definition of (technical 
invention) for biotechnology 'products' is legally problematic as the international patent 
system by way of art. 27(1) of TRIPS presupposes a universal meaning for 'invention' as the 
preliminary requirement for patent eligibility.547 The same article prohibits discrimination 
between the various technical fields. According to this view, isolation of a polypeptide or a 
polynucleotide from their natural states (even if they are recombinant products) does not 
invest sufficient inventiveness in the biological product which categorically emulate the 
naturally occurring substance. Thus, any patentability criteria that recognize biotechnological 
products that are homologues of naturally occurring substances as inventions risk i) 
                                                
544 Peter Rott, ‘The Doha Declaration: Good news for public health’ [2003] IPQ 284. 
545 Rimmer (n.141), p.206.  
546 For more information see: Esther Van Zimmeren and Geertrui Van Overwalle, ‘A paper tiger? Compulsory 
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inventive step and are capable of industrial application. (5) Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of 
Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
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contravening the meaning of 'invention' in art. 27 TRIPS, and/or ii) violating the prohibition 
of discrimination of technical fields in the same Article. According to Palombi, the EC 
Biotech Directive is guilty in both charges.548 Instead, Palombi argues for a ‘Genetic 
Sequence Right’ that will provide a 10 year right to a successful applicant for discovering the 
function and utility of a genetic sequence and disclosing the information related to the 
sequence, function and utility in a publicly available database. In exchange the genetic 
sequence right holder will have a right to a ‘use fee’ paid by parties that use the information 
in the database, the fee being calculated according to a preset tariff that will be sensitive to the 
nature of use; the right holder will have access to legal remedies against unlawful users of the 
information similar to remedies under patent law, however anyone who pays the use fee can 
use the information and use is not conditional on the authorization of the right holder.549 
 
 
II. CRISPR and the Future 
 
In the last four years, research in the gene editing method CRISPR550 (clustered regularly 
interspersed short palindromic repeat) has become the focal point of interest due to its 
enormous potential for genetic engineering applications but also the critical ethical 
implications of certain usages of the technology. CRISPR, in nature, is a defence mechanism 
that exists in various species of bacteria and nearly all species of archaebacteria that uses short 
noncoding RNA molecules to splice and destroy invading viral DNA. To explain very 
basically, special proteins cleave a section of the incoming viral DNA, and integrate it in the 
bacterial genome in a section called the CRISPR locus. The CRISPR locus is then used for 
the transcription of polynucleotides called crRNAs that are complimentary to the sequence of 
the viral DNA from which it was originally taken. The crRNA are then complexed with 
special proteins called Cas proteins that attach to the associated viral DNA sequence should 
it invade again, and cleave the DNA, effectively destroying it. Thus, in case the bacterium or 
a part of it survives the initial viral infection, the bacterium or its descendants that carry the 
updated CRISPR locus will have gained a degree of immunity to future invasions of viruses 
                                                
548 Palombi (n.547). 
549 Ibid. 
550 Jennifer A. Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier, ‘The new frontier of genome engineering with CRISPR-
Cas9’ (2014) 346(6213) Science; Kurzgesagt – In a Nutshell, ‘Genetic Engineering Will Change Everything 
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that are represented in the CRISPR locus.551 The bacterial CRISPR system is now being 
artificially used in other organisms to manipulate certain genes, and replicate the 
manipulations throughout successive generations of the species by making the changes in the 
genome inheritable, using a process called a gene drive.552 
 
As with gene patents stemming from the advent of recombinant DNA technology, the 
inventions stemming from the CRIPSR technology too may challenge the scope of the 
patentability requirements. Rimmer, for example, suggests that the rules and doctrines of 
substantive patent law should be tailored to the need of the specific technology.553 The 
CRISPR technology may allow manufacturing and designing human life in the near future. 
With this, we might witness a third period in the biotechnological inventions. As we have seen 
in the previous sections, as happened with the gene patents, the most efficient response would 
be increasing the thresholds of the existing patentability requirements. Additionally, as moral 
considerations are to an extent also part of the substantive patent law under the EPC and the 
Biotech Directive, a stricter application of the morality exception may also help in the 




In the case of Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980), the Court avoided ‘the patentability of life’ 
objections to the claims covering bacteria, and developed its argument around the ‘product of 
nature’ doctrine. After all, a bacterium is on ‘the periphery of life’ and closer to non-living.554 
Discussing gene patents as a matter of the patentability of life risk involving increasingly 
contorted arguments as more patent applications are made for highly complex 
biotechnological inventions that test our scientific and philosophical understanding of the 
definition of ‘life’. For example, Dr. George Pieczenik, a molecular biologist and a computer 
scientist, commented on his amicus curiae brief in the Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) case that 
“[…] There is no single fundamental […] principle which distinguishes that matter which we 
call living from that which we do not. To attempt to separate patentable from unpatentable 
                                                
551 Alberts, Molecular Biology (n.42), p.434. 
552 Michael Specter, ‘DNA Revolution’ [August 2016] National Geographic, p. 36. 
553 Rimmer (n.141), p.299; also see Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, ‘Is Patent Law Technology Specific?’ 
(2002) 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155. 
554 Rimmer (n.141), p.34. 
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subject matter on the basis of such a concept is to invite confusion in the art, to ignore the 
existing law and to ignore the scientific reality.”555  
 
Yet, the basis of many biotechnological inventions is informational.556 The history of patent 
law portrays that it was traditionally designed to safeguard certain types of inventions.557 
Then, patents were started to be granted to ‘the inventors’ of DNA sequences containing 
human genetic information.558 Should we consider a gene a living matter, information carrier, or a 
chemical compound? For example, in Amgen v. Chugai559, the Court defined a gene as “a chemical 
compound, albeit a complex one”. Rebecca Eisenberg discusses that there has been legal 
confusion on the degree of protection human genetic materials enjoy, and she argues three 
reasons for this legal confusion560: (1) Lack of clarity in the concept of gene; (2) rapidly 
developing new products –i.e. inventions, created by rapidly developing technology; (3) lack 
of clear responses from existing patent law because genetic inventions do not fit perfectly into 
the existing legal norms. Considering that even the science of biology is struggling with 
defining the concept of a gene and the information it contains, this struggle of patent law in its 
interaction with inventions concerning genetic material seems to be far from resolved.561  
 
The legal understanding of a gene stems from the understanding that one gene translates into 
one protein, and the patent system tries to work with this rather mechanical conceptualisation 
of a gene in order to patent genetic sequences. 562  For example, Eisenberg argues, “you 
cannot patent information, as such, that the subject matter of patents is limited to material 
products and processes and does not extend to knowledge and information about the 
world.”563 All the existing substantive patentability requirements are built on this estimated 
conceptualisation of a gene. 
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The aim of this paper was to explore the limits of substantive patent law in addressing gene 
patents, focusing specifically on how the EPC and the Biotech Directive has proposed to deal 
with the patentability of genetic sequences. In order to achieve this, this paper traced the 
evolution of the interpretations of the definitions of substantive patentability requirements of 
patentable subject matter, novelty, inventive step, industrial applicability and sufficiency of 
disclosure in the case law in the boards of the EPO and of the ECJ concerning inventions 
claiming genetic material.  
 
Part A illustrated some of the issues surrounding personalised medicine applications and 
centrality of gene patents in protecting genetic diagnostic tests. Building on this, Part B 
introduced a historical account of the important developments in the relevant scientific and 
technological fields, and how U.S. patent law dealt with the new inventions concerning 
genetic material. The current legal framework in the U.S. now prevents the patentability of 
isolated genetic sequences following Myriad (US) and the patentability of ‘benchmarking’ type 
method claims on genetic risk assessment following Mayo v. Prometheus. Before moving on to 
the European response, demonstrating the current state of the art in the U.S. was important, 
because on a global level, harmonisation of the interpretations of substantive patent law is 
important for international trade. Hence, Part B concluded that following and Mayo v. 
Prometheus and Myriad (US), it is uncertain how the EPC and ECJ will continue to interpret 
current legal framework with regards to patentability of genetic sequences.  
 
Part C showed that the design of the European patent law was justified on instrumentalist 
accounts. For the early grants of gene patents, the patentability criteria were interpreted in a 
very broad way. However, this resulted in over-patenting and threats to health care provision. 
The enactment of the Biotech Directive addressed some of the concerns by raising the 
threshold of industrial applicability. With this new over-arching concept of industrial 
applicability, three major problems surrounding gene patents were efficiently resolved:  (1) 
being a patentable invention as opposed to being a discovery as such; (2) granting patents with 
no designated commercial use, so falling short of the quid pro quo principle; and (3) granting 
patents with a scope too large and disproportionate to the claims. And finally, Part D briefly 
introduced alternative options (other than the overarching concept of industrial applicability) 
of a compulsory licensing, a broader experimental use exception, and a potential sui generis 
gene right. To conclude a brief account of the new CRISPR technology was given to 
illustrate the future of genetic patenting.  
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In light of all this, the paper concludes as follows: Although the gene patents are explicitly 
allowed in the Biotech Directive, the legal situation is far from certain following the decisions 
in Mayo v. Prometheus and Myriad (US). However, fundamentally, the European substantive 
patent law under the EPC and the Biotech Directive, is better equipped to accommodate 
gene patents and with the raised threshold of industrial applicability, reasonably balances the 
public and private interests surrounding genetic patenting. 
 
I wish to conclude this paper by acknowledging all people suffering from rare, complex and 
inheritable diseases, with the hope that developments in biomedical technology may provide 
them relief; and I call onto fellow lawyers to do our parts to ensure that they get it as quick 
and as affordably as possible. 
 
Zeynep Timocin Cantekin 
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